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The works presented in this thesis are the result of the experiments conducted in the 
Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory (CEEL) and in the Consumer 
Neuroscience Laboratory (NCLab) of the Economics and Management Department at the 
University of Trento. The aim of this research is to study the influence of cognitive 
impulsivity on commercial problem-solving and consumer decision-making. We focused on 
the attentional aspects related to the decision-making process as analyzed by the eye 
movements. The first section will present the main topic of the thesis, the key tool used to 
conduct the experiments (eye tracker) and the three papers; the latter will compose the 
second, third and fourth chapter. All the chapters have a common thread: to shed light on 
the cognitive aspects of problem-solving and their implications for the consumer decision-
making process as analyzed through gaze behaviour.  
- The aim of the first paper, “The role of numeracy, cognitive reflection and attentional 
patterns in commercial problem-solving” by Dorigoni, Polonio, Graffeo and Bonini, is to 
analyze the predictive power of two important cognitive abilities, numeracy and cognitive 
reflection, in two different problem solving scenarios with high numerical components.  
- The aim of the second paper, “Getting the best deal: Effects of cognitive reflection on 
mental accounting of choice attributes” by Dorigoni, Cadonna and Bonini is to understand 
if people with low cognitive reflection are more prone to mental accounting across 
attributes of the same product; low cognitive reflectors do not integrate all the attribute 
costs and consequently they do not always choose the best deal. 
- The aim of the third paper, “Cognitive reflection and gaze behaviour in visual tasks” by 
Dorigoni, Rajsic and Bonini is to demonstrate that cognitive reflection has predictive 
power on heuristics and biases related to perceptual and visual tasks. This result is 
extremely important because it reflects a different disposition to see and analyze the 
information depending on the cognitive impulsivity. 
 
Keywords: cognitive reflection, consumer decision-making, attentional aspects, heuristics 




























































































Figure 1. Representation of the dichotomies ..…………………………………………………...…..……10 
 
Figure 2. Documents by year ………..…………………………………………………………………………..11 
 
Figure 3. Documents by author …………………………………………………………………………………11 
 
Figure 4. Density visualization of the citation analysis .…………………………….………………….18 
 
Figure 5. Documents by subject area .………………….……………………………………………………..19 
 





Figure 1. Product scenario ..……………………………………………………………………………….………59 
                          
Figure 2. Exchange scenario .…………………………………………………………………….………………59 
 





Figure 1. Cluster Dendogram for the "holiday by the sea" task  ………………………………..90 
 
Figure 2. Cluster Dendogram for the "washing machine" task  ..……………………………………91 
 
Figure 3. Cluster Dendogram for the "gym membership" task  ..……………………………………91 
 
Figure 4. Decision-making part: Printer scenario explained during the instructions  ..…....93 
 
Figure 5. Scatter plot .……………………….……………………………………………………………………….96 
 
Figure 6. Heat map of the participants with high CRT   ………………………………………………..97 
 
Figure 7. Heat map of the participants with low CRT..………………………………………………….97 
 
Figure 8. Fixations and saccades of a high CRT participant ..………………………………………100 
 






Figure 1. Search task ..……………………………………………………………………………………………..126 
 
Figure 2. Antisaccade task ……………………………………………………………………………………….127 
 
Figure 3. Memory task ..……………………………….…………………………………………………………128 
 
Figure 4. Average performance ………………………………………………………………………….…….130 
 
Figure 5. Probability of Matching bias  ….………………………………………………………….………147 
 
Figure 6. Matching bias index graph ……………...………………………………………………………..149 
 
Figure 7. Probability of antisaccade errors graph…. ……………………………………………………150 
 
Figure 8. Errors in pro and anti trials graph ……………………………………………………………...151 
 








Table 1. Similarities and differences between CRT and insight problems .……….…………...10 
 





Table 1. Accuracy and Attentional Index ……………………………………………………………………72 
 
Table 2. Attentional Index, cognitive reflection and numeracy  …………………………………….….73 
 
Table 3. Accuracy, Attentional Index and cognitive reflection ……………………………………...74 
 




Table 1. Choice attributes used for each commercial package …………………………………......88 
 
Table 2. Pilot study results for the vacation task .  ….…………………………………………………....103 
 
Table 3. Pilot study results for the washing machine task ………………………………….……….103 
 
Table 4. Pilot study results for the gym membership task    ..……………………………….……….103 
 
Table 5. CRT and average dwell time  …… ………………………………………………………………….…104 
 
Table 6. CRT and number of fixations   ………………………………………………………………….…..105 
 
Table 7. Choice accuracy and CRT …………………………………………………………………………...106 
 




Table 1 Average dwell time and numeracy ……………………………….………………………………107 
 




Table 3 Choice accuracy and numeracy  …………………..…………….……………..…………………109 
 




Table 1. Matching bias in the visual search task   ……………………………………………………….138 
 
Table 2. Errors in the “look away” trials in the antisaccade task  …………………………………139 
 
Table 3. Errors in the “look towards” trials in the antisaccade task …………………………….140 
 

















Most people consume products and use services daily; most of the time the 
decisions that they have to make are consumption decisions and in many 
moments of our lives we act as consumers who make hundreds of decisions. This 
role of decision-maker is extremely crucial for our living standards so it is 
important to understand what allows us to fulfill this role. How we analyze 
information is an important part of the decision-making process. In this thesis, 
the focus is on the role of cognitive reflection on consumer decision-making 
because cognitive impulsivity leads to miserly information processing. We 
decided to collect eye movement data in order to better understand what drives 
the attention of the participants and how they analyzed and combined pieces of 
information.  
In the Introduction I will present: 
- 1. Cognitive reflection: a short literature review, focusing on the 
foundations of this construct and on its predictive power in different 
fields; 
- 2. Eye Link 1000 Plus: an explanation of the fundamental principles of 
the tool used to record gaze behaviour; 
- 3. Summary of Empirical Studies: a presentation of the aim of three 
papers that will be shown in the second, third and fourth chapter. 
 
1. Cognitive reflection 
 
1.1. What cognitive reflection is 
 
The typical approach to introduce the notion of cognitive reflection is to use 
Frederick’s initial definition ([1]). He conceived cognitive reflection as "a simple 
measure of one type of cognitive ability, the ability or disposition to reflect on a 
question and resist reporting the first response that comes to mind" (pp. 25). 
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Accordingly with this definition, on the one hand this cognitive ability allows for 
resisting to the first intuition on how to solve the problem; on the other hand for 
reflecting on the question of the problem in order to find a different solution. 
Cognitive reflection is the tendency to override an automatic, and incorrect, first 
answer to the problem, and to engage in further reflection that leads to the correct 
response. The roles of intuition and reason are explained by the dual process 
theories ([2], [3]) that consider cognitive reflection as the ability to stop the first 
intuition that comes automatically, with no effort (System 1) in order to move 
slowly in another direction, with control and effort (System 2) that could lead to 
the correct response; it measures the degree of control of System 2 on System 1 
or, in other words, whether reason takes the reins of intuition.  
Consequently, the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT, [1]) was described as a 
measure of the ability to control a high accessible (incorrect) answer in favour of a 
less accessible (correct) answer, which requires further deliberation. Some 
authors have highlighted the critical issues related to CRT that try to measure 
both resisting and then reflecting (on a different answer) at the same time. As has 
been pointed out by Baron and colleagues [4] “CRT might be considered a test of 
reflection-impulsivity (RI) that is concerned only with the amount of thinking, 
not its direction" (pp.265). Indeed, the cognitive reflection measure can be seen 
also as an impulsivity measure. In particular, the CRT measures monitoring of 
System 1 intuitions such that heuristic (incorrect) responses will be detected if 
cognitive reflection is high enough ([5]). Indeed, in the literature, as we will see 
below, sometimes the answers to the CRT are divided in three main groups: 
intuitive answers, non-intuitive answers irrespective of their correctness and 
correct answers, in order to distinguish the resisting step to the second part of 
the problem-solving process, where people search for a solution. In order to 
understand if the intuitive answer emerges also for the people that answer 
correctly, Travers and colleagues ([6]) measured the mouse cursor movements of 
participants; they demonstrated that even people who answered correctly were 
initially drawn towards the incorrect, intuitive answer. This shows that engaging 
further effortful processing leads to blocking the heuristic responses.  
In my opinion the dual-system dichotomy is not the only duality that emerges 
when we consider the cognitive reflection. We have at least other two main 
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dualities: (a) problem/person and (b) stop/research.  
 
(a) Problem/person dichotomy. CRT items could be considered as problems 
that need to be solved by a person. A problem, starting from the definition of 
Duncker, arises when a living creature has a goal but she does not know how to 
reach this goal ([7]). This happens also for the CRT items; it is crucial to 
analyze the nature of the problem in order to understand the cognitive 
reflection construct ([8]). Accordingly with this point, three are the main 
aspects of the CRT that I will analyze in comparison with another type of 
problems, the insight problems, in order to highlight and to bring out the 
importance of these aspects. 
a. The specificity of all the cognitive reflection tests is that the problem in 
itself triggers an answer, an intuition. In well-known insight problem 
we have an opposite situation; classic insight problems do not trigger an 
attractive alternative response. The intuition, the Aha! experience, the 
Eureka effect, is what the people are looking for, it is difficult to reach 
and most of the time the intuition comes to the mind after an effortful 
research of the solution.  
b. However, if in the first case the automatic intuition leads to the wrong 
way (the incorrect intuitive answer), in the second is the opposite; the 
effortful intuition is the correct answer (the correct not intuitive 
answer). 
c. Furthermore, The Aha! experience is generally described as a very nice 
experience in which the participants have the total certainty about the 
accuracy of their solution ([9]). In the cognitive reflection test, however, 
the intuition appears also with a strong certainty that the solution is 
correct.  
So, in the insight problems the intuition is effortful, after deliberate 
research, perceived as correct as well as it actually is; in the cognitive 
reflection problems, the intuition is immediate, effortless and perceived as 
correct even if at the end it is not. In the insight problems the participants 
are mixed up trying to find the solution looking for a new perspective from 
which they should reconsider the problem; but this happens only when the 
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participant realizes that the intuitive answer is wrong. In summary CRT 
seems at first glance to be similar to the insight problems but they differ in 
two main aspects:  
1. in terms of the presence of an intuition before or after a deliberative 
thinking; 
2. in terms of accuracy of this intuition.  
In the first case an intuition occurs after strong research with a high 
cognitive load but at the end the intuitive conclusion is correct; and in the 
second case the alternative response is initially primed and then must be 
overridden because it is wrong. In both cases, however, the intuition is 
perceived as correct. 
 
(b) Stop/research dichotomy. As already mentioned, the CRT measures not 
only the ability to stop, to block the first automatic intuition, but also to 
research in another direction the correct solution. About the “stop phase” 
there is a crucial point that concerns both, CRT and insight problem: the 
concept of functional fixedness. This term, which originated in Gestalt 
Psychology, was initially used by Duncker to define a mental block, a 
cognitive difficulty in using an object with a fixed function by experience, in 
a different and unusual way in order to find the solution to a problem. The 
intuition comes when there is a reorganization of the elements and their 
meaning in the problem-solving space that overcomes the functional 
fixedness. "The decisive points in thought-processes, the moments of sudden 
comprehension, of the "Aha!" of the new, are always at the same time 
moments in which such a sudden restructuring of the thought-material 
takes place, in which something ‘tips over’” ([7] pp. 375). The fixedness 
appears related to two different elements in the two kinds of problems: 
1. in the insight problems the fixedness is related to the function of an 
element (e.g. to remain in the box, in the 9 dots problem); 
2. in the cognitive reflection test, the fixedness is linked with the 
anchor to a particular thought and intuition (we could call it 
fixedness on thought; e.g. in the CRT anchoring on the answer: 1$ 
the bat and 10 cent the ball). 
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The crucial part of the CRT is not that the decision is based on the first 
intuition but that the problem solver appears to be blocked, anchored, 
fixed on an initial intuition. The intuition in the CRT is an auto-generated 
limitation that restricts the pool of solutions that the person is considering 
and only if the problem-solver breaks this block she could consider other 
possible solutions. People with lower cognitive reflection anchor on the 
first information they consider, thus, being more susceptible to reference 
points as compared to people with higher cognitive reflection. Fixedness is 
negatively related to divergent thinking; people with higher cognitive 
reflection are more likely to exhibit higher remote associations, originality 
scores and lower fluency scores in divergent thinking ([10], [11], [12]) and 
actively open mind thinking (AOT, [4]).  
If the stop moment is represented by the fixedness on the first intuition, 
the research moment is represented by the disposition to reflect, quoting 
Frederick, to search the solution in another direction. The first point is 
what better emerges from the definition of Frederick and the cognitive 
reflection construct hinges on it. The second point was less debated, taking 
for granted that once a person is able to stop her first, wrong, intuition 
then it is almost automatic that she will find the right way in order to reach 
the goal, the solution or in other words, to climb the hill ([13]). Other 
authors besides Baron and colleagues [4] tried to manage this problem; 
Campitelli and Gerrans ([14]) appointed three kinds of answers to the 
CRT: the counter-intuitive answers (divided into correct answer and 
incorrect answers except for the intuitive answer) in order to measure 
inhibition ability and an intuitive answer that represents the incapacity to 
inhibit. Related to this point, on the other side of the problem, there is the 
individual point of view. As Toplak and collegues reported in their paper 
([8] pp. 1276), "the potency of the CRT as a predictor may derive from the 
fact that it taps both a cognitive ability dimension and a thinking 
disposition dimension". So the CRT does not only measure the cognitive 
ability but also a thinking disposition. This last point is extremely 
interesting because it is difficult to disentangle these two concepts using a 
unique measure. It is important to understand what matters more in this 
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test, which subset of cognitive abilities is related to this construct and how 
thinking disposition, as tendency to engage in fully disjunctive reasoning 
and tendency to seek alternative solutions and hypothesis, contributes. 
Anyway, CRT is able to measure the depth of processing and consequently 
the tendency towards miserly processing (important aspects in everyday 
life) in a more accurate way compared to other cognitive ability tests.  
In summary I reported all the above-mentioned similarities and 
differences between CRT and insight problems (Table 1) and a 
representation of the dichotomies that emerge from the CRT (Image 1). 
 
 
 Table 1. Similarities and differences between CRT and insight problems. 
 
                            
 
Figure 1. Representation of the dichotomies that emerge from the CRT. 
 
Now I will analyze the different CRTs in the literature and the predictive 
power of the CRT in different situations. 
 
1.2. Cognitive Reflection Tests 
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Analyzing Scopus source, the original paper by Frederick ([1]) was cited by 1254 
articles from 2006 to 2018. As we can see from the Figure 2, the citations for 
this article increased during this period (from 1 citation in 2006 to 230 
citations in 2018). 
 
Figure 2. Documents by year that cited the original paper by Frederick about 
cognitive reflection. 
An ever-increasing number of authors decided to study cognitive reflection 
and its impact in different fields (Figure 3).  
  Figure 3. Documents by author that cited the original paper by Frederick about 
cognitive reflection. 
  
In the literature, there are several ways to measure impulsivity but these are 
the main approaches: 
(a) self-report. The most common is the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-
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11) [16]);  
(b) performance based (Cognitive Reflection Test, [1]).  
 
In this thesis, we considered and compare four performance based 
measurements of cognitive reflection (Table 2): 
 
 
Table 2. Summary table of the CRTs used in this thesis. 
 
1. The original CRT by Frederick [1] was a three-item test. Given its increasing 
popularity (it is becoming common knowledge among the university 
student population), many other tests were developed as alternatives. We 
analyze three CRTs and indirectly also the original one by Frederick; 
indirectly because, as we will see below, some of these cognitive reflection 
tests added the items to the original test. 
2. Toplak and colleagues ([15]) added four items (CRT4) to the original three-
item test (CRT3) with the result being a seven-item test (CRT7). The following 
aspects highlight the relationship between the CRT and the CRT4: 
a. the four new items had a quite high correlation with the classic three 
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(0.58) and, if we consider the seven-item scale (CRT7), it displayed 
substantial internal consistency;  
b. considering the new four questions, the intuitive responses for them 
appear to be less dominant if we analyze the percentage of the 160 
participants that gave the intuitive answers (the intuitive response in 
the original CRT was given 85.6%, 75.2%, and 60.0% of the time for the 
bat/ball, widgets, and lily pad problems, respectively; in the CRT4 the 
intuitive response was given 31.3%, 51.9%, 41.9%, and 53.1% of the time 
for the barrel, marks, pig, and stocks problems, respectively. 
a. the CRT4 is simpler than the CRT3 (the probability to have a correct 
response in the first test is .24 and in the second is .17).  
Toplak and colleagues examined also the items’ ability to predict performance 
on: 
a. seven rational thinking tasks (Belief Bias in syllogistic reasoning, 
Selection task, Denominator Neglect, Temporal Discounting, Otherside 
Thinking, Framing, Bias Blind Spot). The CRT4 is less predictive than 
the CRT in predicting rational thinking tasks; 
b. cognitive ability (Wechsler abbreviated scales of intelligence);  
c. four thinking dispositions (Need for Cognition, Actively Open minded 
Thinking, Superstitious Thinking, and Consideration of Future 
Consequences). The CRT4 is more predictive than the CRT in terms of 
thinking disposition. 
d. temporal discounting; neither of them (CRT and CRT4) have predictive 
power of it. 
One of the main findings of this study is that CRT4 does, in some cases, 
contribute incrementally to the predictive power of CRT7. One of the reasons for 
this result is that, as we said above, CRT4 has a higher correlation with thinking 
dispositions than the CRT3 does; the first is able to capture a dimension of 
cognitive reflection, indeed thinking disposition, and the second captures the 
cognitive ability part. CRT has its largest correlations with belief bias and 
denominator neglect. In these two tasks, the role of disjunctive reasoning and 
tendency to seek alternative hypothesis is crucial. Perhaps the CRT is not only a 
measure of the tendency towards the class of reasoning error that derives from 
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miserly processing but also a measure of the disposition to search, the ability to 
find relation among elements and to represent and think about alternatives.  
This new version of the test, as described in Primi et al. ([17]) has good reliability 
but four main problems: 
2.1 one of the four new items has three responses and the subject has to choose 
one of them, with the possibility of a subject merely generating a response by 
chance;  
2.2 for one item 31% of responders gave the heuristic response, whereas 46% of 
responders generated a different incorrect response (compared to the original 
CRT where the 60% of the respondents generated the heuristic response);  
2.3 the dimensionality of the scale was not analyzed;  
2.4 it is not clear how the authors identified which items were to be included in 
the scale. 
  
The third CRT that we used and analyzed is the following: 
3. Primi and colleagues ([17]) investigated not only the psychometric 
properties of the original CRT but also a new version of it with three new 
items (along with five items in the 2014 version, [18]), which they called 
CRT long (CRT-L). They defined the difficulty and discrimination 
parameters of the CRT items using the item response theory model and 
the authors investigated the validity of both the original CRT, and the 
CRT-L, by measuring their correlations with: 
a. intelligence (Advanced Progressive Matrices as a measure of fluid 
intelligence); 
b. mathematical and probabilistic reasoning, (probabilistic reasoning, 
numeracy, math fluency and subjective numeracy),  
c. reasoning ability (conditional probability and transitive inference); 
d. decision-making (Risk Seeking Behaviour, Intertemporal Behaviour, 
framing); 
e. thinking dispositions (Superstitious Thinking).  
What they found about the original CRT is its unidimensionality, high 
discriminative power and difficulty. They also tested the unidimensionality of 
the CRT-L; concerning difficulty, the three new items are located one around, 
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one below and one above the mean with a good level of discrimination. The 
new version of CRT appears to be similar to the original CRT in many aspects 
and components. Primi and colleagues make an open question of the 
necessity to develop a measure of cognitive reflection that shows weaker 
correlations with measures of numeracy or intelligence. Related to this point, 
we decided to include also the following test that tried to manage this 
problem. 
4. The problem of the CRT being confounded with numeracy is an important 
point highlighted also in Thomson and Oppenheimer ([19]); they 
developed a four-item test (CRT-2) in order to increase the pool of 
available questions and to address numeracy confounding. Many studies 
have found a correlation between numeracy and the CRT suggesting that 
the CRT is a measure of both cognitive refection and numeracy. Some 
authors asked if we can define cognitive reflection as the propensity to give 
non-intuitive responses and numeracy as the ability to calculate the 
correct answer given that the intuitive answer was rejected ([5]). By 
definition, if we block our first intuition it is more likely that we would 
explore at least one more way to solve the problem, compared to those 
who are not able to inhibit their first intuition (stop/research dichotomy); 
but does the numeracy matter (and how far) to find the solution? In order 
to disentangle the roles of cognitive reflection and numeracy during the 
problem-solving process, Thomson and Oppenheimer used problems with 
less math components, "verbal CRT-type questions", that do not require a 
high degree of mathematical sophistication. They tested the new measure 
and its correlation with belief bias, numeracy scale, time preference, risk 
preference and need for cognition. The authors suggested that the belief 
bias items are similar to the CRT questions because in both tasks is 
required to override an intuitive tendency; both these tasks might measure 
the same construct ([19]). The result of this paper, in addition to the 
important role of belief bias that can also be a source of CRT items, 
showed that CRT-2 does display a significant relationship with numeracy, 
even if the items do not have a prevalent mathematical component, but 




1.3. Cognitive reflection and numeracy 
As we mentioned above, there is widespread study of the significant math 
components of the CRT ([14], [20]) and the nature of their relations ([5], 
[21]) in order to understand what cognitive reflection intrinsically is and 
whether it exists as an independent construct. Thus, in our studies we 
decided to analyze also the numeracy skill in order to understand its 
relationship with CRT in the consumer decision-making process.  
The ability to comprehend and manipulate probabilistic and other numeric 
information is an important skill that allows for an understanding and 
correct usage of numerical information presented in text, tables, or charts. 
This construct, extensively studied also by OECD is defined by PIAAC as the 
ability "to access, use, interpret and communicate mathematical information 
and ideas, in order to engage in and manage the mathematical demands of a 
range of situations in adult life [...] the inclusion of “engage” in the definition 
signals that not only cognitive skills but also dispositional elements, i.e. 
beliefs and attitudes, are necessary for effective and active coping with 
situations involving numeracy" ([22], pp. 34). This construct appears to be a 
simple measure but within itself it has many aspects that were widely 
studied in the literature.  
As in the CRT we have two main approaches to measure this construct: 
a) self-assessment scale to arithmetic skills. Fagerlin and colleagues ([23]) 
developed the subjective numeracy 6-point Likert scale, a subjective 
measure with four items measuring people’s beliefs about their skill in 
performing various mathematical operations, and four items measuring 
people’s preferences regarding the presentation of numerical 
information;  
b) performance based; math fluency, captured by the numeracy scale, 
describes the ability to solve calculation and operation problems quickly 
[24]. The numeracy scale broadly studied in the literature and developed 
by Lipkus and colleagues in the well-known 11 items test ([25]) is an 
example of this kind of measurements. They expanded the Schwartz 
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scale ([26]) adding eight questions to it. The Schwartz scale was one of 
the first performance-based numeracy measures and it included three 
(one question assessing participants’ understanding of chance and two 
questions asking the participants to convert a percentage to a proportion 
and vice versa). 
In the second chapter (where the paper " The role of numeracy, cognitive 
reflection and attentional patterns in commercial problem-solving" is 
presented) we used the 8-item numeracy scale developed by Weller et al. 
([27]). It is a shorter, psychometrically improved measure of numeracy. The 
scale assesses a broader range of difficulty and it is a better predictor of risk 
judgments compared with previous measures.  
Recent reviews of the numeracy literature have found that compared with 
highly numerate individuals, those lower in numeracy are more likely to 
have difficulty judging risks and providing consistent assessments or utility, 
are worse at reading graphs, show larger framing effects, and they are more 
sensitive to the formatting of probability information; it was observed that 
being highly numerate can lead to increased effective reactions to numbers, 
or number comparisons, which, in turn, can result in optimal or sub-optimal 
decision-making ([25], [27]). 
The link between CRT and mathematical skills is also supported by the 
literature ([28]) and it may be observed by a gender analysis. Male 
participants scored significantly higher than females on the CRT ([1], [29], 
[30], [31], [32], [33]); it has been argued that gender differences in the CRT 
might result from the mathematical component of the CRT, as gender effects 
might be reduced or eliminated when controlling for numeracy ([17]). 
Moreover, higher math anxiety (more frequent in female population) leads 
to worse performance in the cognitive reflection test ([34]). Even if it has 
been demonstrated that testosterone reduces cognitive reflection ([35]), 
further studied should be provided in order to understand the role of gender 
in the CRT performance. 
In the second chapter we focused on numeracy because we have been asking 
an important question about the importance of cognitive reflection and 
numeracy: "In consumer problems involving high numerical components is 
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numeracy vulnerability the only factor to play an important role?". We 
focused our attention on cognitive reflection because, considering the 
literature, numeracy is not the only ability that matters in these kinds of 
problems and people with high numeracy skills, who handle numbers daily, 
are affected by some biases and heuristics even in problems involving high 
numerical components ([36], [37], [38], [39]). So our idea of "overlapping 
vulnerabilities" was developed because we think that numeracy is not the 
only ability that plays a role in these kinds of problems; cognitive reflection 
has an important role too, because it predicts the control of the System 2 on 
the System 1. 
What exactly the CRT measures is still subject to debate. The doubt that 
the test only measures mathematical abilities, and not cognitive reflection 
since the CRT contains three mathematically based problems, still persists. 
Further studies are needed at present in order to better understand this 
construct and to implement a test without any mathematical components in 
order to address the correlation between numeracy and CRT. It is also 
debated if CRT has predictive power or not ([5]) and in many studies this 
ability seems to not play a role independent of numeric abilities in the 
decision. 
 
1.4. What Cognitive Reflection predicts 
An increasing number of papers that consider and use CRT was written by a 
huge numbers of authors (Figure 4) in different fields (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 4. Density visualization of the citation analysis. The relatedness of items is 






   Figure 5. Documents by subject area. 
 
In many studies, cognitive reflection was analyzed in combination with 
several other tasks that cover several fields. It is demonstrated to be a 
predictor of: 
a) rational thinking and reasoning ability ([8], [15]); 
b) decision-making skills, time and risk preferences (people with higher 
cognitive reflection is more likely to choose a future reward of greater 
value than a smaller immediate reward ([1]); 
c) thinking dispositions ([40]) which in turn are related with economic 
behaviour and decision.  
d) a much wider range of the heuristics-and-biases tasks and judgment-
and-decision-making tasks ([8]);  
e) conjunction fallacy, illusion of control, overconfidence, base rate fallacy, 
conservatism ([41]) and ratio bias ([42]). 
 
Cognitive reflection and decision-making 
Many other papers, instead, focused their attention specifically on the effect 
of cognitive reflection on the quality of the choice and decision-making. 
Cognitive miser seriously impedes people’s ability to make informed 
decision and deeply influences not only the decision-making process.  
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a) Thoma and colleagues ([43]) for example investigated differences in 
decision-making style and risk-taking among financial traders, non-
trading bank employees, and people not working in finance. What they 
found is that traders have an higher cognitive reflection and financial 
risk-taking was higher in the expert groups (working in financial 
services) and it correlated with cognitive reflection scores (pp. 2). 
Financial traders have a higher propensity to inhibit the use of mental 
heuristics in decision-making.  
b) Graffeo and colleagues found that cognitive reflection drives the quality 
of the consumers’ decision-making process in a purchase problem 
solving context ([37]). Subjects with lower cognitive reflection chose the 
worse deal more frequently and showed a more superficial analysis and 
information search pattern.  
c) Simonovic and colleagues ([44]) studied the importance of cognitive 
reflection in the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) while manipulating the level 
of stress, and they found that people with higher cognitive reflection 
have better IGT performance, and they appear to learn more from the 
outcomes of their decisions even when stressed.  
d) Cognitive reflection also mediates socially biased decisions. Baldi and 
colleagues ([45]) found that cognitive reflection is associated with a 
reduction of decision-making bias associated with social status so 
people with a higher level of cognitive reflection are less influenced by 
celebrity status.  
e) Moritz and colleagues ([46]) showed that managers with higher 
cognitive reflection make more profitable decisions. 
 
Cognitive reflection and metacognition 
Other studies analyzed the specific role of cognitive reflection on metacognition 
because it has been demonstrated that the propensity to think analytically 
facilitates metacognitive monitoring during reasoning; cognitive reflection, as a 
measure of the propensity to engage in analytical reasoning, is related with: 
a) awareness of what we are doing or what we think ([47]); 
b) "faith in intuition" (FI), the individual’s trust in her own intuition ([33]) 
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even if a gender difference occurs (women reported higher FI than male 
subjects);  
c) lower scores in cognitive reflection are related to Dunning-Kruger effect 
([48]) by which the incompetent are often unable to recognize their 
incompetence; 
d) the incapacity to discern fake news from real news ([49]); 
e) CRT was used also to test a dual-processing account of another kind of 
metacognitive monitoring, lucid dreaming ([50]); Rizea and Malinowski 
demonstrated that there is no relationship between rational reflective 
abilities, measured with the CRT, and lucid dream frequency.  
If it is true that higher cognitive reflection leads to higher metacognitive 
monitoring, also the opposite is true; engaging in mindfulness meditation affects 
analytical thought processes. Participants who listened to a mindfulness 
recording have higher CRT performance compared to the control group ([51]). 
 
Cognitive reflection, God and political orientation 
In the literature, belief in God is defined as a natural, automatic and intuitive 
behaviour that occurs in our everyday life; it has been demonstrated that people 
with lower cognitive reflection reported stronger belief in God ([52]) because 
they are more prone to anchor on intuitions (and are more prone to 
superstitious thinking too, [53]). Cognitive reflection also predicts political 
orientation: liberals have a higher cognitive reflection compared to conservatives 
([54], [31]) even if other papers (e.g. [55]) demonstrate that CRT has no 
significant relationship with political orientation.  
 
Cognitive reflection and cooperation 
No significant association was found between CRT and the strict utilitarian and 
deontological response pattern, and willingness to act in the utility-optimizing 
manner ([56]). However, Lohse ([57]) demonstrated that people with higher 
cognitive reflection are more prone to cooperation in a one-shot public good 
game and to trust in trust game ([58]). In a bank-run game cognitive reflection 
predicts the use of dominant strategy only in strategic uncertainty version 
(where the last depositor has no information regarding the decisions of 
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predecessors) but not in the condition with no uncertainty ([59]). 
 
Cognitive reflection and time discounting 
Concerning the field of time discounting, people with higher cognitive reflection 
tend to discount more weakly, as they are more resilient to imposed reference 
points than people with lower cognitive reflection which prefer smaller more 
immediate rewards (steeper discounters) in their choices, preferences, and 
beliefs. ([60], [61]). Also Frederick [1] found that individuals who performed 
well on his CRT were more likely to choose a future reward of greater value than 
a smaller immediate reward. 
 
Cognitive reflection, reasoning strategies and cognitive flexibility 
Ferrer and colleagues ([42]) created different versions of CRT in order to show 
that how the question is framed can influence the answers in terms of accuracy 
and response time. They presented a non-conflict version by making the 
intuitive impulse correct (resulting in an alignment question), shutting it down 
(creating a neutral question), or making it dominant (creating a heuristic 
question). Other studies divided the answers given by the participants into 
different categories ([62], [52]). Erceg and Bubic for example discussed five 
different ways of scoring the CRT: "a regular CRT scoring procedure (CRT-
Regular), adding up the intuitive answers (CRT-Intuitive), calculating the 
proportion of intuitive in total incorrect answers (CRT-Proportion Intuitive), 
scoring only non-intuitive answers irrespective of their correctness (CRT-
Reflection) and calculating the proportion of correct in total non-intuitive 
answers (CRT-Calculation)" ([53], pp. 381). Jelihovschi and colleagues 
analyzed different ways to solve the cognitive reflection test ([63]). They 
reported four different reasoning strategies in answering CRT: no expression 
(participants answered the questions without any calculation); organization 
(participants organized the pieces of information as they prefer), calculation (it 
is the high manipulation of data, participants tried to calculate the solution) 
and erasure (participants provided an answer that was deleted). Calculation 
and erasure predict higher performance. The first strategy is related to a more 
rational analysis of the information and the second strategy is related to 
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cognitive flexibility. Elisa and Parris demonstrated the importance of attention 
in the problem solving process of CRT, analyzing the executive function deficits 
of the Attention Deficit and Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) ([64]). All the three 
core symptoms of ADHD (inattention, hyperactivity and impulsivity) are 
negatively related to performance on the CRT but inattention is the most 
important one for this cognitive ability.  
How we analyze information, how we allocate our attention and the relation 
between attention and cognitive reflection, is the main topic of the third and 
fourth chapter where I will present the second and third paper "Getting the 
best deal: Effects of cognitive reflection on mental accounting of choice 
attributes" and "Cognitive Reflection and gaze behaviour in visual tasks" 
respectively. How we analyze information is important for understanding how 
we integrate pieces of information, which in turn, is related to the 
integration/segregation process underpinning the concept of "mental 
accounting" ([65]). What we assume is that people with lower cognitive 
reflection search for information and allocate their attention in a different way 
compared to people with higher cognitive reflection. The lower cognitive 
reflectors may mentally separate and not integrate information that does not 
belong to the same category because they are more prone to the categorization 
process derived by the System 1. We did not find literature that links cognitive 
reflection to mental accounting and our first exploration, using the eye tracker 
in order to measure attention is, in my view, extremely interesting. How we 
allocate our attention is also the main topic of the third paper in which we 
analyzed the link between executive functioning (in particular set-shifting and 
inhibitory control) and cognitive reflection in two visual tasks. We decided to 
study visual tasks in order to understand if the cognitive reflection acts also in 
the early step of perception. We started from the results shown by Del Missier 
and colleagues ([66]), and the suggestions of Toplak and colleagues ([8]), 
which analyzed the CRT performance in relation to monitoring/inhibition 
dimensions of executive functions. CRT was measured in order to understand 
if cognitive reflection can predict how participants allocate their visual 
attention in a visual search task ([67]) and in the antisaccade task ([68]). We 
chose these tasks because in both there is a prepotent behavioural response: in 
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the visual search task, a matching bias leads participants to look at the colour 
mentioned in the search question ([69]), even though this occasionally leads to 
more searching than necessary. In the antisaccade task "participants must 
suppress the reflexive urge to look at a visual target that appears suddenly in 
the peripheral visual field and must instead look away from the target in the 
opposite direction [...] A crucial step involved in performing this task is the 
top-down inhibition of a reflexive, automatic saccade" ([68], pp. 218). For the 
first time in the literature, these tasks were analyzed as a function of CRT. Our 
goal is to test the hypothesis that people with higher cognitive reflection have a 
better ability to override a prepared or prepotent control over attention when 
such control is required (as in the antisaccade task) or simply beneficial (as in 
the search task) and, consequently, a better ability to switch behaviour 
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2. Summary of Empirical Studies 
 
The primary aim of the empirical studies was to examine the role of cognitive 
reflection on cognitive and visual biases strictly related to the consumer 
decision-making process. More specifically in the Chapter 2, through the paper 
“The role of numeracy, cognitive reflection and attentional patterns in 
commercial problem-solving” we investigated the role of cognitive reflection in 
two decision-making scenarios involving high numerical components in order to 
understand if only numeracy affects the accuracy of the decisions. In the Chapter 
3, “Getting the best deal: The role of a topical mental accounting of multi-
dimensional prices, and cognitive reflection”, we analyzed the role of cognitive 
reflection on the integration of all decision attributes (what we called “intra-
product mental accounting”) and how this affects the accuracy of the choice. In 
the Chapter 4 “Cognitive reflection and gaze behaviour in visual tasks”, we 
examined if cognitive reflection has a predictive power on biases in two visual 
tasks in order to understand if cognitive reflection plays an important role also 
in how we search for information in the initial phase of the decision-making 
process, related to perception. 
The relationship between the CRT and different cognitive biases has been widely 
studied. The lack of control of System 2 on System 1, captured by this test, leads 
to the use of heuristics and biases. With these three studies we demonstrated the 
effect of this point in different tasks making valuable contributions to the 
literature (that will be explain in the following sections) and touching many 
aspects that have not been considered by the literature (e.g. the link between 
cognitive reflection and mental accounting or the relationship between cognitive 
reflection and some visual tasks). 
 
Study 1 
The aim of Study 1 was to understand if in two different kinds of commercial 
problem-solving scenarios involving high numerical components, only numeracy 
affects the accuracy of the decisions. Two are the main hypotheses of this study. 
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The first one is that numeracy affects accuracy because mathematical skill is 
essential in order to solve the problem but cognitive reflection also plays an 
important role in these kinds of tasks because it reflects an ability of the 
participants to perform a more reflective analysis of the information (e.g. to not 
be influenced by a heuristic analysis, choosing for example the option with the 
lower initial price). Therefore, we expect that both numeracy and cognitive 
reflection will predict accurate choice. The second hypothesis is related to the 
depth of cognitive information processing (measured by an Attentional Index 
related to eye movements) and its effect on the accuracy of the choice. 
Considering the definition and the literature about cognitive reflection, we 
expect that people with lower cognitive reflection analyze information more 




How we allocate our attention and how we integrate information is an important 
aspect that impacts the decision-making process and consequently the choice. In 
this paper we study the role of cognitive reflection on the mental accounting of 
choice attributes of an offered product/service package, and its impact on the 
accuracy of choice. Firstly, we presented the new concept of “intra-product 
mental accounting” and secondly we demonstrated that people with lower 
cognitive reflection are more prone to segregate information that does not 
belong to the same category of the other pieces of information. Participants were 
presented with two websites selling the same package, and asked to choose one. 
One of the two packages was always associated to a lower total price than the 
other. The two alternative packages were described by the same choice 
attributes. Some attributes were easily grouped together (similar attributes) 
whereas another attribute was not (dissimilar attribute). Gaze behaviour and 
final choice were recorded.  
 
Study 3 
In this study we investigated if cognitive reflection also affects an initial phase of 
the decision-making process, the visual search. We studied how participants 
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allocate their attention in two different visual tasks (confirmation bias in visual 
task and antisaccade task) that involve overriding a prepotent response and we 
analyzed eye movements in order to understand if people with lower cognitive 
reflection use more biases and are not able to override prepotent responses. 
Important aspects of attention and information search were discussed and we 







Appendix A - Eye Link 1000 Plus 
 
In all of the papers reported in this thesis, we used a really powerful tool: EyeLink 
1000 Plus Binocular Tower Mount, the most versatile solution for eye and gaze 
monitoring available. Eye tracking is growing in popularity amongst 
researchers from a whole host of different fields that try to analyze the 
attention of the people using empirical investigation. Specialized skills are 
required in order to use this tool and to analyze the data collected using this 
instrument. In this section I will report the main concepts related to eye 
tracking research. 
 
2.1. Fundamental principles and technical information 
What we expect from a tool is for it to provide an accurate and precise measure 
of the construct under examination. We want it to capture the same specific 
point that the participant is looking at. Precision, or the other side of the coin 
of variability, is a description of the random errors present in the measures of 
our measurement system, the statistical variability. The accuracy, and so the 
measure of statistical bias, is a description of the systematic errors. A 
measurement system can be accurate but not precise, precise but not accurate, 
neither, or both. In an eye tracking experiment, both these characteristics of 
the measurement system are crucial to correctly and exactly record what the 
participant is perceiving. There are many eye trackers on the market (e.g. Tobii 
TX300, SMI RED 250/500, Tobii T60, Eye Link 1000, LC Technologies Eye 
Follower), mobile and static, and each of them have strengths and weaknesses 
that act on the precision and accuracy of the measurement system. We have 
pros and cons for all the three types of the eye tracking: glasses, a mobile type 
(a), and a fixed type, divided into the remote eye tracking (b), with a imaginary 
box where the head of the participant can move, and the tower mount eye 
tracker (c) where the head of the participant is fixed by a chin-rest, a forehead-
rest, or both. Depending on the type of research, you will need specific features 
of the measurement system and so you will deal with different issues. The Eye 
Link 1000 Plus Binocular Tower Mount provides highly accurate and precise 
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monocular or binocular data acquisition at up to 2000 Hz (the highest 
sampling frequencies available) using a chin and forehead rest; it is a very 
powerful tool that, if used correctly, can provide a high level of research. It 
collects data with low variable error, so with low root mean square deviation 
and consequently high precision, a small systematic error, high accuracy and 
almost no data loss. It incorporates the camera and illuminator housing within 
a combined chin and forehead rest via infrared reflective mirror. The Tower 
Mount affords the largest field of view of all mounting systems. The average 
accuracy measured with real eye fixations at multiple screen positions on a per 
subject basis, is down to 0.15◦, with a blink and occlusion recovery of 0.5 ms 
and a spatial resolution measured with an artificial eye, of 0.01◦. The gaze 
tracking range is 60◦ horizontally and 40◦ vertically and the allowed head 
movements for +/- 25 mm horizontal or vertical. 
However, even if this is a really professional tool for the gaza detection, 
there are several procedures necessary to achieve the precision and accuracy 
that this tool can reach.  
(1) First and foremost, to define a specific research question, as we said above, 
is necessary for three main reasons: to prevent an inappropriate use of eye 
tracking in experiments that do not need eye tracking in order to answer to 
the research question; to better understand the best eye tracker type for 
our research and to lead an appropriate use of the Area of Interest (AOI). 
This last point will be analyzed in the next section.  
(2) Secondly, we need a calibration procedure as accurate and precise as 
possible. This is an important and a fundamental process that we have in 
order to align what the tool measures with what the participant sees. We 
could have the most powerful tool, but if we calibrate in the wrong way, we 
will most likely collect inaccurate responses. The underlying concept 
which has forms the basis for eye tracking measures is that the human 
vision is divided into two main parts: a small central area with very high 
resolution, called foveal vision, and the vast majority of the visual field 
with poor resolution, called peripheral vision. What we want to do with the 
initial calibration and validation measures is to align the position of the 
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stimulus with the foveal vision, in order to collect precise and accurate 
data about where participants are looking. Bad calibration procedures may 
cause systematic and random errors (for an overview on this topic see [1]). 
Other reasons could be, for example, the mascara on the eyes of the 
subject, the glasses, contact lenses, dirty mirrors or bad lighting in the lab. 
A small error rate is physiological because we have a really specialized human-
machine interaction and because the human eye is subject to small, rapid, 
constant and involuntary eye movements, called microsaccade with an 
amplitude that varies from 2 to 120 arcminutes. For these reasons, most of the 
software that collects and analyzes eye tracking data files have embedded 
algorithms for dealing with noise detection, fixation, and saccade recognition 
issues related to measurement errors. There are also many event detection 
algorithms (factories). 
The function of eye movements and consequently what an eye tracker 
measures and studies, is to direct the eye to a new part of the visual field and 
to keep parts of the world fixed on the retina, with the foveal vision. The first 
function is associated with the saccade, a fast and most of the time voluntary 
movement from one fixation to the next. Sometimes it is also a reflex because 
it is related with the automatic nervous system and more specifically with the 
fight or flight response that leads a person to look at a potential harmful event 
or attack that occurs close to her [2], [3]. Instead, the smooth pursuit, the 
vestibulo ocular reflex (VOR), the optokinetic reflex (OKR) and the fixation 
have the common goal of keeping the world fixed on the retina.  
(a) The smooth pursuit eye movements are slow and both voluntary or 
reflex and they allow the eyes to follow a moving object; 
(b) the eye also has a tendency to move after a saccade and before it fixates 
on an object, this movement is known as glissade;  
(c) the VOR is a fast reflex that stabilize the images on the retina during 
head movements producing eye movements in the opposite direction of 
the head movements; 
(d) the OKR is an eye movement that allows to follow a moving object that 
moves out of the field of vision, to return then to the position when it 
first saw the object; a fixation that occurs when we maintain the visual 
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gaze on a single location.  
We did not consider the millisecond duration of each element mentioned 
above because, as we will see in the section "Measures" we should define 
the properties of these eye movements or fixation, considering our research 
field and the features of the stimulus. As presented in the paper "Is the eye-
movement field confused about fixations and saccades?", we also have to 
consider that different definitions may be used across different fields and 
within one field. Confusion could be due to three possible sources: (i) 
different frames of reference, (ii) functional versus oculomotor versus 
computational definitions of fixations and saccades, and (iii) event 
classification in the eye-tracker signal [4]. I will get into the nature of 
measurements in the specific section. However, it is important to 
understand the movements and fixations related to the tool that we used. 
- With the tower eye tracker (head fixed and with the eye tracker output 
signal, the point of regard to pixels looked at, in the world fixed 
coordinates), with a static stimulus we can measure only fixations and 
saccades; with a dynamic stimulus we can measure also smooth pursuits 
and OKRs; 
- with the remote eye tracker (head free and with the eye tracker output 
signal, the point of regard to pixels looked at, in the world fixed 
coordinates), with a static stimulus we can measure only fixations and 
saccades; with a dynamic stimulus we can measure also smooth pursuits 
and OKRs; 
- with the glasses (head free and with the eye tracker output signal, the 
point of regard to pixels looked at, in the scene camera image, in head-
fixed coordinates) we have only dynamic stimulus and we are able to 
measure all of the movements, saccades, smooth pursuits, OKRs and 
VORs. 
A difficult issue to solve for software that analyzes eye tracking data, is to 
disentangle saccades from smooth pursuits. It is not only a matter of velocity 
of the movement because also a smooth pursuit could be as fast as a saccade. 
For example, the velocity-based adaptive algorithm has been proposed in order 
to allow efficient saccades detection but also a more recent version, the 
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Sacc/SP algorithm [5]. 
In all of the studies presented in this thesis we used a tower eye tracker (Eye 
Link, 1000 Plus) with static stimulus. It is always better to use the simplest set 
up to answer the research question. 
 
2.2. Area of Interest 
The Areas of Interest, AOIs, are regions in the stimulus that are interesting for 
the research question, and they are used to quantify whether and how many 
participants looked at the particular regions. They are also known under 
different names, such as IAs (interest area), ROIs (regions of interests) and 
Zones. 
First of all it is necessary to keep the research question in mind when we 
draw the AOIs because different research questions require a different 
subdivision of the interest area. Take, for example, the first fixation of a photo 
representing a woman and a man. The AOIs to test the hypothesis that the first 
fixation will be on the eye of the two people, is completely different to the AOIs 
to test the hypothesis that the first fixation will be on the woman rather than 
the man. As we can imagine, the interest areas in the first case will divide the 
eyes of the two people to the other part of the photo. In the second case, 
instead, they will divide the woman’s figure to the man’s figure. Setting up 
different AOIs will lead to different analyses to test different hypotheses. If you 
do not think ahead to the AOIs it is possible that you will not be able to 
disentangle if the participant focused more on a specific part or another. 
Different hypotheses need different AOIs and different AOIs allow testing of 
different hypotheses. This does not mean that after a first analysis based on a 
specific subdivision of the space you cannot reset the AOIs and manipulate 
them in order to test another hypothesis. If you draw your AOIs after data 
recording, you are forming post-hoc hypothesis, based on the results while 
inspecting the data. If you have a hypothesis about statistics of certain gaze 
locations then the AOIs you draw are implicitly part of the hypothesis, so if you 
alter your AOIs you alter your hypothesis and your statistics. They are part of 
your hypothesis. It is important to keep the research question in mind when 
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drawing AOIs because they are the main tools for further analysis of eye-
movement data. They allow to define and detect AOI hits, dwells, transitions 
and the AOI total skip. 
There are several advices to consider before drawing the AOIs but the main 
advice regards the dimension of the AOIs and their location. It is important 
not to make AOIs too small; the minimal AOI size is limited by the precision 
and accuracy of the eye tracker. An error of 0.5° means a circle error with a 
radius of 0.5 cm on a screen placed at 57 cm. If you AOIs are too small, a 
possible error leads to consider a fixation in the AOI out of the interest area or 
the other way around. It is important to draw the AOIs as large as possible 
considering the research hypothesis because it allows to capture also the 
fixation that are subject to error. 
There are different production methods for drawing interest areas. They are 
created using a tool for spatial segmentation usually supplied in the analysis 
software for the eye tracker, called AOI editor or they can create customize 
interest areas directly from the programming software used to design the 
experiment (e.g. MATLAB) indicating the coordinates of the interest area. In 
the first case you can have hand drawn AOIs, pre-set shapes drawn AOIs, or 
AOIs automatically generated by the stimulus. You can base the drawing of the 
AOIs on different criteria (semantic AOI e.g. [6], distributed AOI used most 
the time in the marketing research e.g. [7] and gridded meaningless AOI for a 
string representation of the scan path and dwell map [8]). AOIs can be based 
on static images or dynamic depending on the type of the stimuli. 
The basic AOI events, as we said above, are AOI hits, dwells and transitions. 
- The AOI hit is "the most primitive AOI event, which states for a raw 
sample or a fixation that its coordinate value is inside the AOI, it underlies 
all raw AOI measures, including those based on fairly complex 
representations like proportion over time graphs" [9]. 
- The dwell, or gaze or glance, is a visit to an AOI from entry to exit. It 
collapses all the information about a specific AOI, giving for example the 
duration, the starting point and the ending point of a gaze into that interest 
area. Dwells can be represented with dwell map or hit map. The first one is 
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used most of the time with the gridded AOIs and it is a table with the dwell 
time of the all the single cells in the grid. The heat map uses different colours 
to represent the dwell duration, instead of representing this duration in 
numbers (Figure 6): in a scale from red to green where red represents the 
longer duration of the dwell and the green the shortest one, with varying 
levels in between. That is why the heat maps are colour-coded. Both these 
kinds of maps can be used to quickly understand the visual hierarchy of the 
elements of the stimulus in order to make, for example, "informed decisions 
about how to optimize the placement of screen elements" [10]. 
- The transition, or gaze shift, is the movement from one AOI to another. 
You can also have a return, or revisit, that is a transition to an AOI already 
visited; or a within AOI transition, when there is a saccade within an AOI.  
 
 
Figure 6. A heat map taken from [11]. From this picture we can understand that people did 
not look at the tiny images on the Panasonic site. 
 
This would be considered a proper transition because the term transition 
implies an eye movement from one AOI to another. We have another 
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conceptual problem when the transition is not linear from an interest area to 
another but spaced by a fixation out of the first AOI before entering to the 
other. We could have also another situation when an AOI is skipped in the 
transition from an AOI to another (AOI first skip). When an AOI is not looked 
for the total duration of the trial, it is called AOI total skip (e.g. an 
advertisement on a newspaper). 
When you consider a transition between two AOIs you are automatically 
considering this process over time. Adding the variable "time" allows you to 
analyze the movements among AOIs or fixation of a specific area. The AOI 
string is a sequence of either fixation-based AOI hits or dwells that consider 
occurrence during time. As mentioned in [9] there are at least three different 
varieties: 
• A string is given by all the fixations on the different AOIs expressed in 
letters (e.g. LLHGGMCL means that the first two fixations were in the L 
interest area, the third in the H interest area and so on and so forth). If 
there are two fixations they both will be expressed. 
• A compressed string that considers only dwells, so without repetition (the 
previous example will become LHGMCL). 
• A string that considers only the first dwell in every single AOI (the 
previous example will become LHGMC); the maximal string length may be 
maximum the number of the AOIs presented in the stimulus. 
The transition matrix and the use of the Markov model allow to use probabilistic 
model describing or modelling the data. However, there are different ways to 
analyze the data; we will see them in the next section. 
 
2.3. Measures 
The main attribute measures that we can analyze from an eye tracking data file 
are the location of the eye gaze, the duration of a fixation to a particular area 
and the movement from one fixation to another. The location of a fixation is 
represented by the x and y coordinates on a grid where the stimulus can be 
placed in order to understand the elements presented on the screen. Usually a 
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fixation is extremely short, between 70 and 600 milliseconds and it is recorded 
on the eye tracking data file depicted by a detection algorithm of the eye 
tracking software. The information related to the fixation is extremely 
important but we should pay attention to what we can infer from that. A 
fixation does not necessarily imply that the brain is processing the information 
and it is true also the opposite: information that is not in the foveal area is not 
necessarily not analyzed (it could be analyzed). Anyway, in the literature is 
assumed that fixations depict the focus of attention on an object even if using 
an eye tracker we cannot confidently infer anything about a person’s analysis 
because the fixation may not accurately and precisely represents cognitive 
processing; we have to be very careful about inferring the type of processing 
starting from a fixation. The duration of the fixation is another important cue 
that can help us to understand if the gaze is related to the attention. A 
clustering of a number of fixations in a particular region and their duration 
can tell us that it is very likely that the user is paying particular attention to 
that specific area. The problem is to understand why she is looking at that 
visual element. This could mean that there is a high cognitive load, she is 
processing the information more in depth, or she is confused by this element. 
During fixations the eye is still, even if some micro-movements like drifts, 
tremors and micro-saccades can occur; saccades are eye movements between 
fixations ([12]). In the literature, two are the main eye tracking data analysis: 
fixation analysis (1) and saccade analysis (2). A fixation analysis depicts the 
focus of attention and it is the most often used measure in eye tracking 
research ([13]). It is divided into two kinds of analysis: (1.1) fixation duration 
(given by the focus of attention parameters: “dwell time” and “total dwell 
time”) and (1.2) fixation counts.  
(1.1) Dwell time, also known as glance duration, visit duration, glance or gaze 
([12], [9]), is defined as a sum of all fixation durations during a dwell in an 
area of interest (AOI) on the stimulus. It has its own duration, starting 
point and ending point. Longer fixations are associated to deep 
information processing ([14], [15]). However, why the person is processing 
that information in that way it is difficult to infer (e.g. it could be due to the 
difficulty of the task, or for the significance of that specific area of interest). 
 
 46 
(1.2) Fixation counts often represent general understanding of the focus of 
attention. There is a negative relationship between fixations duration and 
fixation counts: the greater the number of fixations, the lower their 
duration and vice versa ([12], p. 412). When an object is meant to draw 
attention in the stimulus, this increases fixation counts in that AOI. 
Fixation counts provide some information about processing of information 
(e.g. fewer fixations could mean faster processing of information from the 
stimulus; level of expertise, experts have fewer fixations compared to 
novices and only on relevant areas). 
Eye Link 1000 plus also records data in addition to fixations, such as saccades, 
blinks, glissades, micro-saccades and pupil size. The visual hierarchy of a 
scene is given by a saccades analysis.  
(2) The number, proportion, rate and direction of the saccade provide 
information about how people analyze the information. There are several 
questions that this analysis tried to answer (e.g. "In what direction did the 
eye move?"; "How far did the eye move?"; "For how long did the eye 
move?") using the direction of the saccades in degrees.  
Using saccadic direction, we know from the literature that: 
(a) most saccades are aligned with the picture horizon ([16]) and horizontal 
saccades are more frequent compared to vertical and oblique saccades 
(oblique saccades are the rarest) ([17]; [9], [18]).  
(b) Saccadic velocity is affected by the age, the level of sleepiness, the 
difficulty of the task, mental and neurological disorder, drugs and 
alcohol.  
(c) Saccadic velocity decreases in people older than 75 years (compared to 
participant younger than 43), in tired people with low level of vigilance, 
in people with melancholia or Alzheimer’s disease. 
(d) Conversely, saccadic velocity increases during the REM sleep phase and 
in people under the effect of drug or alcohol.  
(e) Saccadic velocity increases as the difficulty of the task increases and 
decreases with increasing time for a task ([9]). 
An analysis based on saccades allows an accounting of the transition number, 
proportion and rate. Transitions are movements between areas of interest; as 
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described by Holmqvist and colleagues ([9], pp.422) the number of transitions 
between two areas has been used as a measure to evaluate "the importance of 
an area of interest, when an area is so important that it must be more or less 
continuously monitored, transitions rates drop". The number of returns to an 
area, also called "re-fixation", is informative too because it represents how 
much the area is informative, and it is linked to the need to refresh working 
memory. 
Eye tracking has been applied to numerous fields, including cognitive 
psychology, psycholinguistics, gaze signaling in social interaction, perception 
of art and film, visual search, game theory, marketing, ergonomics, education 
and developmental psychology, industrial engineering, human factor, human-
computer interaction, computer science and user experience (ux), in order to 
study visual attention on a stimulus. Eye trackers are also used to study the 
behaviour of a participant in a specific situation, in real life, such as a 
supermarket, or in a virtual world (e.g. driver fatigue [19], or the effect of a 
mobile use during driving [20]). Following the subdivision of Duchowski ([21]) 
about the eye tracking applications we could have four main fields of research 
in eye tracking studies.  
(1) The first one is related to neuroscience and psychology where the 
neurophysiological investigation is associated to perception issues, such as 
illusory contours, scene perception and visual search.  
(2) The second is more related to industrial engineering and human factors 
where researchers study the human behaviour linked to the eye 
movements in potentially dangerous situations (e.g. aviation, driving and 
visual inspection, such as drug inspection or medical X-ray inspection).  
(3) The third is related to computer science and human computer interaction; 
researchers focus on the interfaces between people (users) and computers. 
(4) The last main field is related to marketing and advertising (e.g., web pages 
design and how it drives the consumer behaviour, print advertising, 
television enhancements, product layout design).  
Eye tracking is now being widely used in a combination of the second and the 
third point to understand how users interact with a variety of devices, 
software, websites, video games, etc. From this field, most of the time, 
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scientists want to analyze, for example, the time spent on a web page or on an 
advertising, what drives the attention in the first 10 seconds, which are the 
areas that are most viewed, if there are some areas that are never looked, what 
are the attributes of the first fixation. It is an extensively analyzed field with 
hundreds publications. 
In our studies we did not use a self-report of where the participants looked 
because in the literature it was determined to be an unreliable measure ([22], 
[23]). We used dwell time and dwell counts to study how people with different 
level of cognitive reflection analyze pieces of information. In the next section 
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Many everyday commercial decisions deal with different situations and 
amounts of information. Most of the time the consumer manages and 
compares numerical information. The aim of this paper is to investigate the 
cognitive skills that drive this choice process and the role of attentional 
patterns, cognitive impulsivity and numeracy on the accuracy of the choice. 
The experiment was recorded by the eye tracker, Eye Link 1000. Results 
indicated that patterns of attention during decision-making predict the 
accuracy and are associated with cognitive reflection. 





Individual differences in cognitive abilities and skills play an important role 
in both problem-solving and decision-making [1]. With this paper we want 
to shed light on the role of cognitive reflection during the choice process in 
order to highlight the importance of considering different levels of consumer 
vulnerabilities. As will be developed in the Discussion section this analysis is 
important not only as a research question but also for its practical 
implications. To target consumer policy measures in order to safeguard 
vulnerable consumers, it is essential to know in which aspects they are 
vulnerable. More deeply we want to understand if, depending on cognitive 
reflection and numeracy, people show different attentional pattern. How we 
analyze information could affect the accuracy of the choice and it could be 






Numeracy is a cognitive skill recently and widely studied for its characteristics 
and for its predictive power in different fields. It has been defined as a 
quantitative literacy or mathematical literacy and there are several 
definitions in literature related to aspects of this construct. For example, in 
Kirsch [2] numeracy has been defined as "the knowledge and skills required 
to apply arithmetic operations, either alone or sequentially, to numbers 
embedded in printed materials, such as balancing a checkbook, figuring out 
a tip, completing an order form, or determining the amount of interest on a 
loan from an advertisement". In the Programme for the International 
Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC), designed and coordinated by 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), this 
issue was addressed in its own right as the ability to access, use, interpret and 
communicate mathematical information in order to deal with different 
situations in adult life. Math is an important component of everyday 
situations (e.g. shopping, cooking, interpreting information in the media, 
playing an instrument, financial transaction, etc.) and, therefore, numeracy 
can play an important role in all of these activities. Low levels of numeracy 
limit access to educational training and jobs and it can hinder performance 
and productivity [3]. Fagerlin et al. (2007) developed the subjective numeracy 
6-point Likert scale [4], a subjective measure regarding people’s beliefs about 
their skill in math, and people’s preferences regarding the presentation of 
numerical information. One of the most used numeracy scales was developed 
by Lipkus and colleagues (2001). It is an 11-item test [5], which extends 
previous work by Schwartz et al. (1997) [6]. A quick test for statistical 
numeracy and risk literacy was also developed, The Berlin Numeracy Test [7] 
and the abbreviated numeracy scale by Weller et al. in 2013 [8] was 
presented as a shorter, psychometrically-improved measure of numeracy 
based on Lipkus’ scale and Peters’ scale [9]. As a test of mathematical and 
probabilistic reasoning we used the 8-item numeracy scale developed by 
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Weller et al. (2013) [8] (see Appendix A). This scale consisted of eight items, 
five from the original Lipkus et al. scale two from the CRT scale by Frederick, 
and one of the Peters et al. items [9]. 
 
1.2. Cognitive Reflection 
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), initially studied by Frederick (2005) [10], is a 
predictor of rational thinking and reasoning ability [11], [12]; decision-making 
skills, time and risk preference [10] and thinking dispositions [13] which in 
turn are related to economic behaviours and decisions. Toplak et al. (2011) [11] 
explored the predictive properties of the CRT in a much wider range of the 
heuristics and biases tasks, and judgment and decision-making tasks. In 
Noori’s study (2016), [14] people with lower cognitive reflection were 
significantly more likely to exhibit the illusion of control, overconfidence, 
conjunction and base rate fallacy, and conservatism. Graffeo et al. (2015) [15] 
found that cognitive reflection drives the quality of the consumers’ decision-
making process in a purchase problem-solving context. Subjects with lower 
cognitive reflection choose the worse deal more frequently and show a more 
superficial analysis and information search patterns. Simonovic et al. (2016) 
[16] studied the importance of cognitive reflection in the Iowa Gambling Task 
(IGT) where the level of stress was also manipulated, and they found that 
people with higher cognitive reflection have better IGT performance and that 
they appear to learn more from the outcomes of their decisions even when 
stressed.  
In the present study, we consider and compare three measurements of 
cognitive reflection in addition to Frederick (2005) (see Appendix B). The 
original CRT was a three-item test, now widely known, and many other tests 
have been developed. Many cognitive reflection tests have been developed for 
two main reasons, to cope with the spread of the correct answers of Frederick’s 
(2005) and to address numeracy confounding in the cognitive reflection test. 
We used three tests [12], [17], [18]. Toplak et al. (2014) added four items 
(CRT4) to the original three-item test (CRT3), to have a seven-item test 
(CRT7). Primi et al. (2015) investigated not only the psychometric properties of 
the original CRT and its reliability but also a new version of it adding three 
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items in a test that they called CRT long (CRT-L). Thomson and Oppenheimer 
(2016) developed a four-item test (CRT-2) in order to increase the number of 
questions in the test and to address numeracy confounding. Many studies have 
found correlations between numeracy and CRT [19], [20] , [21] suggesting that 
the CRT is a measure of both cognitive reflection and numeracy. For the first 
time all these tests were used in the same experiment. The full set of questions 




The goal of this study is to investigate the role of numeracy and cognitive 
reflection on the quality of consumer choice in two decision scenarios. More 
in depth we want to analyze the importance of the Attentional Index (which 
we will explain later) on the accuracy of the choice and how the two 
individual differences are linked with this index.  
The two decision scenarios present a hypothetical comparison between two 
shops that sell the same product with two different initial prices and discounts; 
and a hypothetical comparison between two currency exchange services that 
change money with two monetary exchanges and fees. In each decision 
scenarios, one of the two options is more convenient than the other. We 
designed these scenarios with a strong numerical component in order to 
force people to make a considerable cognitive effort to solve the choice task. 
Given this context, in this experiment CRT is used as a proxy for the 
willingness and/or ability to engage in a more complex, effortful, and 
accurate strategy while we are less interested in the CRT as a proxy for 
inhibition/stopping ability.  
The mental calculation needed to choose the dominant option requires two 
attentional aspects: 1) the participant maintains the attention either in the 
price (monetary exchange) area or in the discount (fee) area (so that only one 
of the values must be kept in working memory during the calculation phase); 
long fixations are expected because the mental calculation of the final price is a 
complex cognitive operation that is composed of distinct functional processes 
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that require deep information processing. Longer fixations are commonly 
associated with deep information processing [22], [23], [24]. Computational 
load and fixation length are related and "fixation duration can be used to 
provide insights into cognitive processes [. . .] cognitive processes comprising 
conscious mathematical steps of information integration should go along with 
long fixations, whereas scanning and automatic processes should produce 
mainly short fixations" [25]. 
We calculated an index that expresses how much the participant’s analysis is 
in line with what is to be expected by an individual who tries to calculate the 




We suppose that the participants’ analysis of the information, expressed by 
the Attentional Index, predicts the performance in the task. 
H1: We expect that participants’ analysis of the information, expressed by the 
Attentional Index, predicts the accuracy of the choice. As we said above, 
calculations need a deeper analysis of the information, so we expect that the 




H2.1: We expect that cognitive reflection predicts the depth of cognitive 
processing and the type of analysis carried out by the participants during the 
problem-solving phase, measured by this Attentional Index. In regard to the 
definition of cognitive reflection, we expect that people with lower cognitive 
reflection analyze information more superficially. 
H2.2: We also expect that numeracy is not strictly linked to the Attentional 
Index  and a potential relationship between these two variables could be 






We expect a partial mediation effect of the Attentional Index on the CRT 
predicting accuracy. In order to test this hypothesis we have to control if: 
1. the Attentional Index predicts the accuracy (information obtained from 
the hypothesis 1); 
2. The CRT is a predictor of the choice accuracy; 
3. The CRT predicts the Attentional Index.; 
3. conducting a multiple regression analysis with CRT and Attentional Index 
predicting accuracy the effect of the Attentional Index is significant and the 
effect of CRT is no longer significant (full mediation) or it has decreased 
(partial mediation).  
 
Considering the literature reviewed earlier, we think that cognitive plays an 
important role in these kinds of tasks because it reflects an ability of the 
participants to perform a more reflective analysis of the information (e.g. to 
not be influenced by a heuristic analysis, choosing for example the option 
with the lower initial price). Therefore, we expect that cognitive reflection will 




Fifty-three participants were recruited from the University of Trento. We 
collected as many participants as our resources allowed to increase statistical 
power. We excluded 1 participant for a missing-data problem. They received 
an amount of money proportional to their performance. The experiment was 
divided into two main parts. In the first part, we asked participants to make 
decisions in two different types of scenarios. We used problems that have an 
optimal solution that allows us to investigate the role of cognitive skills on 
the quality of choice. We had two different scenarios that we will call 
product and exchange. 
 
3.1.  Scenarios 
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In the product scenarios, participants saw forty-four different items. Each 
item describes the same product for sale in two shops with different initial 
prices and discounts (see Figure 1). Subjects were asked to choose the shop 
where they would prefer to buy the product. Each item presents a different 
product (e.g., iPhone, DVD player, sofa...). In the exchange scenario, we 
presented 20 items in a context that describes an identical currency in two 
currency exchange shops with different money values and fees. Participants 
were asked to choose the shop where they would prefer to change their 
money. Each scenario uses a different currency; from the two offices, they 




  Figure 1. Product scenario.                             Figure 2. Exchange scenario. 
 
After participants took a practice test, we explained that the rule for the 
money reward depended on their performance in the tasks. 
The experiment is a 2x2 factorial design with the two scenarios as the within 
subject factor and the position of the price (or monetary exchange) as the 
between factor (it can be on the first row or on the second). In the Product 
scenario, as in the Exchange Scenario, the option with the lowest initial price 
(or the higher monetary exchange) is the dominant one 50% of the time. 
During the decision-making part, we recorded the position of the 
participants’ gaze using an Eye link 1000, in order to investigate the search 
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and analysis of participants’ information processing. 
 
4. Results 
As a first analysis we created a correlogram (Figure 3) that represents the 
correlation matrix (Table 1) with the scores of the tests for the individual 
differences (numeracy and CRT) measured in the experiment in order to 




Figure 3. Correlogram, a graphical display of the correlation matrix, highlighting the most 
correlated variables in a data table. Positive correlations are displayed in blue and negative 
correlations in red colour. Colour intensity and the size of the circle are proportional to 
the correlation coefficients. In the right side of the correlogram, the legend colour shows 
the correlation coefficients and the corresponding colours. 
 




As we mentioned above, the 8-item numeracy scale developed by Weller et 
al. [8] consisted of eight items, five from the original Lipkus et al. scale two 
from the CRT scale by Frederick, and one of the Peters et al. items [9]. We 
mentioned “Weller with” when we consider the integral version of the 
numeracy scale by Weller and “Weller without” when we remove the two 
Frederick’s items in order to avoid a higher correlation with the CRT scales. 
Indeed, as we can see from the table, the “Weller without” version is less 
correlated to the CRT scales. We considered also all the CRT scales without 
the three Frederick’s questions in order to analyze them with “Weller with” 
in the same regression. Anyway, since the CRT scales are designed in order 
to measure cognitive reflection we conceptually prefer the integral version of 
the CRT scales (the combination of the following tests: Frederick, Primi et 
al., Toplak et. al., Thomson and Oppenheimer)  combined with “Weller 





We ran both generalized linear mixed models and linear mixed models 
(depending on the nature of the dependent variable), which incorporated 
fixed-effects parameters and random effects, to evaluate the hypothesis 
above mentioned. As widely discussed in the article "Fitting Linear Mixed-
Effects Models Using lme4" [26], we fit random effects associated with non-
nested grouping factors. Such models are common in item response theory, 
where subject and item factors are fully crossed. We ran models where the 
intercept varying among subjects and trials.  
 
4.2. Hypothesis 1 
We calculated an index that expresses how much the participant’s analysis 
is in line with what is to be expected by an individual who tries to calculate 
the final price (or the final amount of money) for each of the two shops 
(exchange offices). We considered (AIi) as a dependent variable and the 
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CRT composite measure as an independent variable. The index is defined as 
follows. 
- The subject i has a specific Attentional Index, AIi. It indicates the total 
time that i remains focused on the price (or monetary exchange) areas, 
which we denote with Ti,p, compared to the discount (fee) areas, Ti,d. This 
index is given by the following formula: 
AIi = (Ti,p - Ti,d)/(Ti,p +  Ti,d) 
The total time spent fixating on the price minus the total time spent fixating 
on the discount divided by the total time fixating on the price plus the total 
time fixating on the discount.  
We calculated whether participants remained more focused on price areas 
or discount areas. This analysis showed that all participants remained more 
focused on price areas. The participants that had a higher cognitive 
reflection spent more time on the price area compared with the discount 
area. This means a longer fixation on that specific area than on the discount 
in order to figure out the calculation. This also means a more in-depth 
analysis of the information because, as mentioned above, longer fixations 
are commonly associated with deep information processing. 
As we said above, calculations need a deeper analysis of the information, so 
we expect that the Attentional Index predicts the accuracy of the choice. As 
a first analysis, we ran a mixed effects logistic model to examine if the 
Attentional Index is predictive of accuracy. We considered accuracy as a 
dependent variable and Attentional index (AIi) as an independent variable. 
The results showed that the Attentional Index was predictive of accuracy 
(Appendix C, Table 1) with a z-value = 2.070 and p-value = 0.038. With this 
analysis we found that this index predicted accuracy.  
We confirmed the first hypothesis that the participants’ analysis of the 
information, expressed by the Attentional Index, predicts the accuracy of the 
choice. 
After this analyses we proceeded to analyze the results of the second 
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hypothesis in order to understand if cognitive reflection, numeracy or both 




In order to test the Hypothesis 2.1 and 2.2 we ran five different models 
(with all the combination among integral or limited versions of CRTs and 
integral or limited versions of numeracy). What we can see from the Table 2 
(Appendix C), with regard to numeracy, is that only the integral version of 
numeracy (with the two questions from the Frederick’s CRT test) is 
significant in order to predict the Attentional Index with a t-value = 1.817. 
We could explain this result giving the predictive power to the two 
Frederick’s questions included into the integral version of numeracy. On the 
contrary both the CRT versions have a predictive power with a t-value = 
2.622 for the integral version (with the three Frederick’s items) and a t-
value =  2.397 for the limited version (without the three Frederick’s items). 
We decided to maintain the integral version of the CRT (with all the 
cognitive reflection tests because the Frederick’s question was designed in 
order to measure this construct. A numeracy scale with also these questions 
would be a “dirty variable”.) 
In the model with both (“All CRTs with” and “Weller without”) only the 




In order to confirm or disprove the third hypothesis we controlled four 
different points: 
1. the Attentional Index predicts the accuracy (information obtained in order 
to test the first hypothesis Table 1, Appendix C; we reported this result also 
into the first model of the Table 3); 
2. a regression analysis with CRT predicting Attentional Index where the 
relationship is significant (information obtained from the hypothesis 2.1; 
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model 3 in Table 2, Appendix C); 
3. a regression analysis with CRT predicting accuracy where the relationship 
is significant (model 2 in the Table 3 Appendix C); 
3. a multiple regression analysis with CRT and Attentional Index predicting 
accuracy (model 3 in Table 3, Appendix C). 
We already have found that the Attentional Index predicts the accuracy 
(Hypothesis 1) and that the CRT predicts the Attentional Index (Hypothesis 2.1). 
In order to test the second and third point of the mediation analysis we 
computed a generalized linear mixed model where the accuracy is the 
dependent variable and the CRT (second point) or both CRT and the 
Attentional Index (third point) were the two explanatory variables. This last 
model was ran in order to test if the effect of the cognitive reflection on the 
accuracy could be explained by the Attentional Index. 
As we can see from the second model of the Table 3 (Appendix C) the CRT 
predicted the accuracy with a z-value = 2.568 and a p-value = 0.0102. 
In the third model of the Table 3 (Appendix C) with both variables, the CRT 
predicted the accuracy with a z-value = 2.238  and a p-value = 0.025 and the 
AI predicted the accuracy with a z-value = 1.682  and a p-value = 0.0925. The 
analysis shows that CRT is a more relevant predictor of accuracy, compared to 
the attentional index.. 
All the analyses mentioned above show that: 
• the Attentional Index predicts accuracy.  
• The CRT predicts the AI and numeracy (without the Frederick’s 
questions) did not.  
• In the model with both, CRT and AI to predict accuracy, the two 
variables remained significant; however, CRT is a more relevant 
predictor of accuracy, compared to the attentional index. 
We decided to compute an extra analysis in order to answer another 
important research question that emerges from the analysis: "in a 
 
 65 
commercial problem-solving scenario involving high numerical components, 
does only numeracy affect the accuracy of the decisions?".  
In the Table 4, Appendix C we presented the effect of numeracy (without the 
Frederick’s questions), combined with the CRTs (with all the four versions) 
and the Attentional Index, on accuracy. 
• Results of the models indicate that:  
• The limited version of numeracy measured by [8] predicts the 
accuracy with a z-value = 4.481 and a p-value = 0.0001; 
• In the model with the limited version of numeracy measured by 
[8] and the full version of CRT, numeracy has a significant 
predictive power (z-value = 3.602 and p-value = 0.0003) and all 
the CRTs taken together do not (z- value = 0.856 and p-value 
= 0.392). 
• In the model with numeracy and the Attentional Index, numeracy 
has a significant predictive power (z-value = 4.591 and p-value = 
0.0001) and also the Attentional Index has a significant predictive 
power (z- value = 2.263 and p-value =0.0236). 
• In the model with all the variables only numeracy (z-value = 
3.887 and p-value = 0.0001) and the Attentional Index (z-value = 




These results indicated that the effect of numeracy is more relevant than the 
effect of CRT on accuracy. The role of numeracy in this particular economic 
decision-making process is predominant. However, the role of cognitive 
reflection on the attentional index is crucial and the role of numeracy on this 
variable is not significant. CRT is used as a proxy for the willingness and/or 
ability to engage in a more complex, effortful, and accurate strategy and this is 
reflected in their predictive power on the attentional index.  
 
 66 
Four are the main findings of this research: 
• In these tasks with high numerical components, the role of numeracy to 
predict the accuracy of the choice is predominant; 
• The depth of analysis (measured by the Attentional Index) is crucial for 
the accuracy of the choice; 
• The depth of analysis (measured by the Attentional Index) is independent 
from the numeracy; 
• The depth of analysis is predicted by the cognitive reflection. 
The last point highlight the role of cognitive reflection not only as an ability to 
inhibit a prepotent response, but also a measure of the propensity, inclination 
to a deeper and more reflective analysis of the information and reasoning. 
Anyway, further research is needed in order to understand the link between 





The main aim of this paper was to analyze how people deal with problems 
involving high numerical components when they have to find the most 
convenient option. Two scenarios were presented that were taken from daily 
life in order to understand the role of numeracy and cognitive reflection on 
accuracy. From the results we saw that not only numeracy, but also cognitive 
reflection played an important role in the accuracy of decision-making for 
these tasks. More specifically, cognitive reflection seems to play an 
important role in how we analyze information and on the level of attentional 
processing. People with lower cognitive reflection seem to analyze the pieces 
of information more superficially without going deeper; a cognitive 
impulsivity that leads to an approach closer to System 1, with fast and 
automatic intuition instead of System 2, which is more analytic and reflective 
[27]. Anyway the role of numeracy is crucial for the accuracy of the choice 
and numeracy is a more relevant predictor of accuracy, compared to the 
cognitive reflection. However, the crucial role of cognitive reflection on 
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attention is still interesting and further research is needed to investigate 
whether and how CRT affects attention (and therefore accuracy) and the link 
between numeracy, strategy selection, and attention allocation in decision-
making. Anyway, these analyses showed that cognitive reflection could be 
considered as an indicator of the level of engagement in more in-depth 
analysis. It is one thing is the ability to perform the computations leading to 
the accurate answer (numeracy) and another is the willingness to engage in 
more demanding reasoning (a part of cognitive reflection). 
Certain groups of consumers are more vulnerable than others but the 
consumer’s choice should be seen more as a resulting product of overlapping 
vulnerabilities and not as the result of only one force (e.g. age [28], self-
control, gullibility, susceptibility [29], less education, marital status [30]). 
Vulnerabilities, as for example numeracy and cognitive reflection, could be 
seen as forces that act on the person, driving her performance. What we can 
see is only the resulting vector, the consumer in our case, with all her 
vulnerabilities. The freedom to choose, directly linked to the individual 
capability, reflects the level of an individual’s resources, in the capability 
approach [31], [32]. What we argue with this paper is that the person’s 
capability, and consequently what makes people vulnerable as consumers, 
comprises all the consumer characteristics and cognitive abilities (not only 
numeracy but also cognitive reflection and many others) that should be 
analytically researched in order to understand the resulting vector and the 
real power that gives freedom to that specific person. As a second step, a 
debiasing process is important in order to protect and to safeguard 
consumers and their needs during the consumption experience through 
consumer policy measures [28], [33]. Specifically, the attention of the 
European unfair commercial practices directive, the consumer protection law 
and consumer protection statutes increasingly recognize the importance of 
consumer vulnerability [34]. In recent years the European Parliament 
adopted several resolutions dealing specifically with consumer protection (e.g. 
resolution of 22 May 2012 on a strategy for strengthening the rights of 
vulnerable and resolution of 11 June 2013 on a new agenda for European 
Consumer Policy). The main point is to better understand the consumer 
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vulnerabilities before targeting consumer policy measures. As we can easily 
understand, if we think about consumer vulnerability only as a numeracy 
issue we will develop a school support which deals, for example, only with 
arithmetic operations. Cognitive reflection, as we have seen from this study, 
plays an important role too and it should have a direct relevance for 








Taken from [8]: 
(1) Suppose you have a close friend who has a lump in her breast and must 
have a mammography. The table below summarizes all of this 
information. Imagine that your friend tests positive (as if she had a 
tumor), what is the likelihood that she actually has a tumor? 
(2) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs a dollar more than the 
ball. How much does the ball cost? Cents  
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in 
size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long 
would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? Days  
(4) In the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the chance of winning a 
car is 1 in 1000. What percent of tickets of ACME PUBLISHING 
SWEEPSTAKES win a car? 
(5) In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chances of winning a $10.00 prize 
are 1%. What is your best guess about how many people would win a 
$10.00 prize if 1000 people each buy a single ticket from BIG BUCKS? 
(6) Imagine that we roll a fair, six-sided die 1000 times. Out of 1000 rolls, 
how many times do you think the die would come up as an even 
number? 
(7) If the chance of getting a disease is 20 out of 100, this would be the 
same as having a % chance of getting the disease. 
(8) If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be 






Cognitive Reflection Test 
Taken from [10]: 
(1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs a dollar more than the 
ball. How much does the ball cost? Cents  [Correct answer: 5 cents; 
intuitive answer: 10 cents] 
(2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it 
take 100 machines to make 100 widgets? Minutes  [Correct 
answer: 5 minutes; intuitive answer: 100 minutes] 
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in 
size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long 
would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? Days  [Correct 
answer: 47 days; intuitive answer: 24 days] 
Taken from [12]: 
(1) If John can drink one barrel of water in 6 days, and Mary can drink one 
barrel of water in 12 days, how long would it take them to drink one 
barrel of water together? Days  [Correct answer: 4 days; intuitive 
answer: 9] 
(2) Jerry received both the 15th highest and the15th the lowest mark in the 
class. 
How many students are in the class? Students  [Correct answer: 29 
students; intuitive answer: 30] 
(3) A man buys a pig for $60, sells it for $70, buys it back for $80, and sells it 
finally for $90. How much has he made? Dollars  [Correct answer: 
$20; intuitive answer: $10] 
(4) Simon decided to invest $8,000 in the stock market one day early in 
2008. Six months after he invested, on July 17, the stocks he had 
purchased were down 50%. Fortunately for Simon, from July 17 to 
October 17, the stocks he had purchased went up 75%. At this point, 
Simon has: a. broken even in the stock market, b. is ahead of where he 
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began, c. has lost money [Correct answer: c; intuitive answer: b] 
Taken from [17]: 
(1) If three elves can wrap three toys in hour, how many elves are needed to 
wrap six toys in 2 hours? [Correct answer: 3 elves; intuitive answer: 6 
elves] 
(2) Jerry received both the 15th highest and the 15th lowest mark in the class. 
How many students are there in the class? [Correct answer: 29 
students; intuitive answer: 30 students] 
(3) In an athletics team, tall members are three times more likely to win a 
medal than short members. This year the team has won 60 medals so far. 
How many of these have been won by short athletes? [Correct answer: 
15 medals; intuitive answer: 20 medals] 
Taken from [18]: 
(1) If you are running a race and you pass the person in second place are you 
in? [Correct answer: second; intuitive answer: first] 
(2) A farmer had 15 sheep and all but 8 died. How many are left? [Correct 
answer: 8; intuitive answer: 7] 
(3) Emily’s father has three daughters. The first two are named April and 
May. What is the third daughter’s name? [Correct answer: Emily; 
intuitive answer: June] 
(4) How many cubic feet of dirt are there in a hole that is 3’ deep x 3’ wide 
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Getting the best deal: The role of a topical mental accounting of 




In this paper, we study the role of cognitive reflection on the mental 
accounting of choice attributes of an offered product/service package, and its 
impact on the accuracy of choice. Participants were presented with two 
websites selling the same package, and asked to choose one. One package had 
always a lower total price than the other. The two alternative packages were 
described by the same choice attributes. Some attributes were easily grouped 
together (similar attributes) whereas the other attribute was not (dissimilar 
attribute). Gaze behaviour and final choice were recorded. Last, participants 
were asked to fill several cognitive reflection tests. Results show that 
participants with lower cognitive reflection integrate less the dissimilar 
attribute and this is reflected in worse choice accuracy. 
Keywords: online purchases, eye tracking, cognitive reflection, 




“Mental accounting is the process, sometimes implicit, by which individuals 
and households keep track of and evaluate their transactions” ([1] p.12). The 
notion of mental accounting has spawned considerable research, both 
empirical and conceptual ([2] for a recent review). 
A fundamental aspect of mental accounting is to describe how people 
mentally organize economic information: What gets combined with what. In 
the context of the evaluation of a purchase, for example, people tend to use a 
topical mental account of the advantages and disadvantages of the transaction 
([3]; [4]; [5]). With that outcome-framing, only the outcomes related to the 
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topic of the purchase are posted in the same mental account, and jointly 
evaluated. Several behavioural findings can be predicted from a topical 
organization of the elements of the decision problem. 
In the classic calculator problem ([3]; [5]), only the prices (regular and 
discounted) associated to the topic of the purchase, the “calculator”, are 
considered (e.g. the price of the other purchase, the jacket, is not considered). 
The use of the topical mental account rather than a comprehensive one (where 
the price of the jacket and other aspects such as current wealth or future 
earnings are considered) affects the likelihood to accept the same price 
discount. When people use a topical mental account rather than a minimal one 
of the same transaction (e.g. they only consider the difference in the two prices 
of the calculator) a similar effect is found. Another classic demonstration of 
mental accounting is the ticket problem ([3]; [5]). Here, people are more 
inclined to go to see a play when they lost a note than a pre-purchased ticket 
for the play of the same monetary value. 
Henderson and Peterson ([6]) use the categorization theory to explain the 
typical findings in the calculator and the ticket problems as well as other 
choice anomalies due to mental accounting. They argue that (p. 97) “a mental 
account is merely a type of category that contains the gains and losses 
(advantages and disadvantages) of an event or element, similar to an 
evaluation category described by Fiske and Pavelchek ([7])". The principles 
that govern the grouping of elements in the categorization theory are the same 
principles guiding the inclusion of gains, losses, advantages and disadvantages 
into a mental account. For example, when the category “play” is mentioned 
people evoke that conceptual category which allows them to distinguish 
between conceptually relevant (e.g. the loss of a 10$ ticket) and irrelevant (e.g. 
the loss of a 10$ note) elements. This would also explain why, for example, in 
the ticket problem the loss of a 10$ note that was intended to be used to buy 
the ticket (a “ticket-directed note”) is more easily posted to the same mental 
account of the purchase of the ticket than the loss of a note of the same 
monetary value ([8]). 
People spontaneously use conceptual similarity cues to group things such as 
expenses, words, risks, gains or losses (see [9] for a review on the grouping and 
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labelling of resources). For example, consumers spontaneously group expenses 
into separate mental accounts (e.g. “clothing”, “food and entertainment”. See 
[10]). Anecdotes show that households often structure their shopping list by 
organizing planned purchases by a conceptual similarity criterion: ‘Bananas’ are 
written on the list near to ‘apples’, and not near ‘electric plugs’. 
People make distinctions in terms of types of wealth such as “current spendable 
income”, “current assets” and “future income” ([11]). They also categorize types of 
saving/gain, and this categorization affects their future choices. For example, 
Henderson and Peterson ([6]) found that money saved from one category (e.g. 
cash refund for returning a record album) was more likely to be spent on the 
same category than a different category. 
People also seem to group losses in terms of their conceptual similarity. Singer 
et al. ([8]) findings suggest that the loss of a “ticket-directed note” is more similar 
to the loss of a “ticket” than the loss of a “note”. Because of their semantic 
associative strength, the first two losses are more easily grouped together (and 
posted to the same mental account) than the third loss. 
Last, people group semantically related prices, and risky outcomes. By using 
different versions of the calculator problem, Bonini and Rumiati ([12]) shown 
how the use of a comprehensive mental account (e.g. the integration of the prices 
of the two purchases) is contingent upon the similarity structure of the problem. 
A comprehensive mental account is used when the two planned purchases belong 
to the same basic category level (e.g. a classic and casual shirts) and not when 
they relate to different categories (e.g. a classic shirt and a camera). A similar 
finding is reported in Bonini, Tentori and Rumiati ([13]) where people combine 
risky outcomes of a choice option only when the outcomes are semantically 
related (e.g. contraction of a virus alpha with probability p and contraction of a 
virus beta with probability q). 
In terms of basic cognitive processing, the grouping of elements by their 
semantic relatedness is congruent with the spreading activation model of 
semantic memory. This model predicts that the activation of a conceptual 
category first spreads to strongly related concepts ([14]). Meyer and Schvaneveldt 
([15]) have found evidence of a semantic priming effect.  
Also, conceptual categories are used to spontaneously organize the free recall 
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of a list of randomly presented words that have to be memorized ([16]). As 
argued by Tulving ([17], p. 352), the spontaneously subjective organization of 
words in clusters (e.g. words related to category “Fruit” and words related to the 
category “Cloth”) help people to accurately memorize them. 
In sum, there is ample experimental evidence and theoretical elaboration on 
the use of conceptual similarity to group the elements of a decision problem (or 
to organize a memory task). In this paper, we study how people code multi-
dimensional prices of alternative commercial offers in the presence of a 
conceptual similarity structure, and how this editing activity affects the quality 
of their choice (e.g. the selection of the best offer). Consistent with the 
previously discussed literature, we argue that people spontaneously group 
semantically related prices of a transaction before making the final choice, and 
this type of coding will affect the quality of their commercial choice (conceptual 
similarity hypothesis). 
To clarify the object of our study, and our research predictions consider the 
following commercial offer presented by a multi-dimensional price (Hooman 
Estelami [18], [19], quoted in [20]). If you accept it, you get a brand new car at 
the price of 20,000€, with the automated-opened roof at the price of 4,000€, 
with the special metallic paintwork for 1,000€, and a loan which entirely 
finances the purchase of the car at the 4 percent rate. Take it or leave it: No 
room for bargaining. This is a bundle offer, and is not negotiable. 
If people use a “comprehensive mental account” of the commercial offer, they 
might incorporate several aspects such as current wealth, future earnings, and 
integrate all price information of the transaction, including the financial cost for 
the buying of the car. [footnote 1: In this experiment, we are not studying the 
hedonism editing principles of mental accounting ([21]). For example, we are 
not comparing a partitioned price with the corresponding all-inclusive price. 
However, if price/payment information is considered a proxy for a loss (e.g. 
they all entail a displeasure) then people should consider the all-inclusive price 
of the transaction, and not its separate price components (or a subset of) 
because people prefer integrated than segregated losses (evidence supporting 
that prediction in the domain of bundle prices is reported in Johnson, 
Herrmann and Bauer ([22]), ([20]). However, see Abraham and Hamilton, 
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([23]) for a recent meta-analysis where mixed findings are reported]. This is not 
a negligible cost. In fact, it amounts to more than 10% of the true price of the 
car, that is 2,600€ in interest over its life. 
People might differently structure the decision problem by an alternative 
coding of the multi-dimensional price. They might group semantically related 
prices, and segregate the unrelated ones. For example, they integrate the first 
three prices because they all relate to the category “car”: the price for the car, 
and the price for its special physical features. With this coding, they segregate 
the loan cost because it is perceived as not semantically related to the topical 
object “car” (e.g. loans are something related to finance and banks, not to cars). 
This mental representation of the prices of a transaction is coherent with the 
notion of “topical mental account”, and with a more general interpretation of 
mental accounting process as category-based. Said differently, the grouping of 
prices is based on their categorical relevance (e.g. whether or not they relate to 
the topic or category of purchase). 
Evidence from the car loan market shows that many consumers do not take 
in consideration how the cost of the loan will affect the final cost of the 
purchase. Most people overpay for car loans and some car companies received a 
fine for their commercial policy; as described by the president of the National 
Consumer Union, some car companies tried to promote car sales in conjunction 
with a high interest loan to the consumers ([24]). Most cars are purchased with 
the help of a car loan and most consumers are taking out car loans at interest 
rates that are much higher than they could have gotten if they had just shopped 
around more ([25]), and this happens also in the house market ([26]). 
Consumers take the first interest rate that is offered to them; they did not 
integrate the cost of financing the car purchase in the total car cost, making a 
disadvantageous purchase. There might be several reasons why people spend so 
much time and effort to look for the best-featured car, and dedicate so little 
time for searching the best loan. One of them is that consumers are focused on 
the object “car” and its mentally inherent features (“topical mental account”), 
and disregard aspects that are perceived as not directly related to the car itself 
(e.g. the type of financial plan to buy it, future earnings, etc.). 
Problem structuring matters. If people do not integrate the semantically 
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unrelated prices, they may be tempted to accept the transaction that looks very 
good on the semantically-grouped prices, although it is very bad on the other 
prices. Moreover, when asked to make a choice between two offers X and Y 
where the first is better than the latter on the grouped- prices but worse totally 
(e.g. X is more expensive than Y when all prices are considered), people might 
be tempted to choose the worst commercial offer. 
As said, the aim of this paper is to investigate how people code a multi-
dimensional price. Specifically, we want to control whether people segregate 
semantically unrelated prices of a commercial offer, and how this affects the 
quality of their choices. Our main research hypothesis is that the presence of a 
semantic relatedness structure in the decision problem affects both the coding 
of prices, and the resulting quality of the choice. Specifically, we make the 
hypothesis that (i) when a semantically unrelated price is displayed, people 
segregate it from the other semantically related prices of the transaction. Also, 
(ii) the final choice is a function of the relative cost of the semantically- grouped 
prices. For example, if the cost of the grouped prices for X is lower than for Y, 
then people will choose X -even when X is more expensive than Y. Finally, (iii) 
the two predicted findings (i) and (ii) are expected to be more pronounced for 
impulsive than reflective consumers. This third prediction is based on the fact 
that the scientific literature has consistently found that cognitive reflection 
correlates with heuristics and biases ([27]; [28]; [29]); people with low CRT 
scores base their judgments and decisions on System 1 processes (fast, 
automatic, effortless and related to intuitive thoughts). Since highly impulsive 
people tend to be overridden by System 1 processes (fast, automatic and 
effortless), which ultimately make them more vulnerable in many ways ([30]), 
we expect that they will be more affected by similarity basic assessments 
(considered to be a typical System 1 process, see [31] for a discussion) even 
when the latter are not informative and useful in order to "solve the problem" 
(e.g. getting the best deal). 
The aim of this paper is to explore the role of similarity perception in the 
domain of economic choice. If most of the studies on mental integration vs. 
segregation focus on the mental accounting of different products or services, 
here we study whether similarity perception affects the mental accounting of 
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different attributes within a given product or service. We argue that attributes 
that are typically related to a good (e.g. its price or qualities) are more easily 
grouped together than attributes that are considered to be external to the same 
good (e.g. an extra warranty). For example, people might be presented with a 
commercial offer for a printer bundle where they are provided with the 
following cost components: the printer cost, the transport cost, the installation 
cost, and the extended warranty cost. We argue that the first three cost 
components are more easily grouped together (e.g. the costs for “printer”) than 
the fourth cost (e.g. something “external to the printer”). If people rely on this 
intra-product mental accounting then they will tend to evaluate the deal based 
on the spontaneous grouping of the two types of cost components: the similar 
vs. the dissimilar ones. This similarity based mental accounting of product 
attributes will ultimately affect choices (e.g. the distribution of the cost of 
attributes between the similar vs. dissimilar cost groups can be manipulated). If 
people rely on this mental accounting of the cost of attributes for a given deal, 
then they might overlook the fact that the cost for the dissimilar attribute is too 
high. 
In this paper we want to control whether there are differences between high 
vs. low cognitive reflection individuals in the mental accounting of choice 
attributes for the same package deal, and if this ultimately affects the accuracy 
of their choices. Mental accounting processes will be assessed through the 
analysis of gaze behaviour whereas the accuracy of choice will be measured by 
the proportion of optimal choices (i.e. the choice of the product/service package 
with the less total final price). 
 
2. Methods 
2.1. Pilot study 
The aim of the study was to understand how people categorize choice 
attributes of an offered product/service package (e.g., a printer package). 
Specifically, we wanted to detect those choice attributes that are easily 
grouped together compared to those that are not. To achieve this goal, a card 
sorting task was performed by the participants to the pilot study. The card-
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sorting method has been developed for designing mainframe menu systems 
([32]), and has been recently used in the user centered design field in order 
to create information architectures of effective and user-friendly websites 
([33]; [34]). We collected data as suggested in Tullis and Wood ([35]). For 
each commercial package, participants were presented with six set of cards 
(each card representing a choice attribute), and asked to group the cards by 
following a criterion which made sense for them. The names of the choice 
attributes to be grouped were printed on individual cards in an easily 
readable font. In Table 1 are shown the choice attributes used for each 
commercial package. 
 
Washing machine     Gym membership     Holiday by the sea 
 
 
room charge WM cost GM cost 
tourist tax transport cost registration card cost 
breakfast mounting cost discount 
credit card fee extended warranty sauna 
discount disposal cost locker cost 
wi-fi fee appropriate detergent doctor’s appointment 
 Table 1. Choice attributes used for each commercial package. 
 
 To detect which choice attributes are easily grouped together and which are not, we 
computed how many times each attribute was grouped together with all the others. 
Results are reported in Table 2, 3 and 4 (Appendix  A).  In order to visualize the 
results, we used Cluster Dendograms (Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3) that represent the 
hierarchical cluster analysis ([36]). 
 





Figure 2. Cluster Dendogram for the "washing machine" task. 
 
 
Figure 3. Cluster Dendogram for the "gym membership" task. 
 
We chose as similar attributes (in green) the three closest ones, and as 
dissimilar attribute (in red) the one farthest from the similar ones (based also 
from the frequency tables in the Appendix A; in the first column are reported 
the four choice attributes for each commercial package used in the next 
Experiment). 
On the basis of these results, in the next experiment each package was 
described by four choice attributes, that is the three similar attributes and the 
fourth dissimilar one. The three similar attributes were those that were more 
often grouped together. The dissimilar attribute was that which was less often 
grouped with the three similar ones. Let us call the first three attributes (p, q 
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and r) "similar choice attributes", and the last attribute (s) "dissimilar choice 
attribute". Table 2 (Appendix A) summarizes the four choice attributes for 
each commercial package used in the next Experiment. 
 
2.2. Experiment 
2.2.1. Participants and procedure 
The subjects who participated in the study were 54 university students (34 
female, 20 male; mean age= 23.6 years, SD=4.5). We collected as many 
participants as our resources allowed to increase statistical power. The 
decision-making task was made incentive-compatible; during the 
instructions we told them that they will receive 3 euros for participation and 
from a minimum of 3 euros to a maximum of 11,5 euros on the basis of their 
performance. Every participant, after reading the instructions, took part in a 
decision-making section and afterwards, took four different CRTs without 
any time limit. We recorded participant eye movements during the decision-
making part of the experiment, while eye movements during the cognitive 
reflection test part were not recorded. Eye movement data were recorded 
using an Eye Link 1000 Plus Binocular Tower Mount, which provides a data 
acquisition at up to 2000 Hz. The participants completed the decision-
making task in the psychtoolbox interface on a Dell computer with a 23 inches 
screen. 
 
2.2.2. Decision-making task: choosing where to purchase 
After reading the instructions, participants were shown a product/service 
package, which was available in two different online shops. The two websites 
were offering exactly the same product/service but with a different 
distribution of costs across the same four choice attributes. The two 
alternative shops were presented in the rows, and the four choice attributes 
were presented in the columns. For each item, one of the websites had a 
better promotion than the other (i.e. the full total cost of the package was 
less). Specifically, 50% of the time the "X website" was the best option, and 
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50% of the time the "Y website" was the best. 
In Figure 4, the decision scenario related to the printer’s package (which 
was used as a training choice trial) is shown. Choosing between bundled 
commercial packages is quite common in the online market as well as in the 
utility market. For example, an offer is valid only if you choose the same 
company for both gas and electric power. 
Participants were presented with three types of decision scenarios. Each 
one was related to a different commercial package: holiday by the sea, 
washing machine and gym membership. We considered as a between subject 
factor, the position of the dissimilar choice attribute “s” in the matrix. This 
was done in order to control a possible order effect. If we had left the 
dissimilar attribute always in the last column, the not integration effect could 
be explained by an effect order. Therefore, in the first condition all the 
participants saw the "s" element in the fourth column; in the second 
condition all the participants saw the "s" element in the first column, and in 
the third condition all the participants saw the "s" element in the third 
column. 
 
Figure 4. Decision-making part: Printer scenario explained during the 
instructions. 
 
Since each subject was assigned to one and only one of the three 
conditions, the position of “s” is a between subjects factor; so the subjects 
had been divided in three groups, or conditions, depending on the position 
they would see the element "s". We decided to consider the position of the 
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dissimilar attribute as a between subject factor in order to avoid a possible 
disorientation effect on the participants. 
Leaving all the attributes value as numbers (not in percentage), the 
computation would be too easy and most likely all the attributes would be 
integrated between them. So, for each package, we built three different variants 
where one or two component costs was/were expressed in percentage terms. 
Specifically, in one variant, the cost of the choice attribute "s" was in 
percentage, in the second variant the cost of choice attribute "r" was in 
percentage, and in the third variant both choice attributes "s" and "r" were 
expressed in percentage terms. This was constant for all three decision 
scenarios, and was done in order to control for a possible not integration 
effect due to the fact that the "s" element was expressed in percentage. Each 
participant was presented with these 3 versions of the 3 packages for a total 
of 9 decision scenarios. Each participant saw 3 different scenarios and for 
each scenario 3 different variants depending on which attribute was expressed 
in percentage (r, s or both); depending on the condition, in all the 9 decisions, 
she saw the "s" attribute in the same column. 
As far as the choice of the website is concerned, 50% of the time the "X 
website" was the best option, with the best package deal, and 50% of the time 
it was not. 50% of the time integrating the "s" attribute to "p", "q" and "r" 
was necessary in order to choose the best option, 50% of the time such 
integration made no difference. Let us call the tasks in which the "s" element 
was the swing attribute "crucial tasks". For each participant, four out of nine 
tasks were "crucial tasks". 
 
2.2.3. Cognitive Reflection Tests 
We used four different Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) in order to have a 
stronger measure of this construct and to address the problem of the diffusion 
of the answers to the original CRT by Frederick (2005) [37]. Participants 
completed Frederick’s test, Toplak et al., (2014) [38], Primi et al. (2015) [39] 
and Thomson and Oppenheimer (2016) [40]. Cognitive reflection was scored 




2.2.4. Research Hypotheses 
The aim of the study was to determine whether a choice attribute (“s”) that is 
perceived dissimilar from the other three attributes ("p", "q" and "r") for a 
given commercial package, is integrated or kept separated during a choice 
process (mental accounting of choice attributes). As discussed in the 
Introduction, low CRT people rely heavily on automatic and intuitive 
processes (e.g. similarity basic assessments). Thus, we expect that: 
H1: Low CRT people tend to mentally segregate the fourth dissimilar choice 
attribute from the three similar ones. 
Segregation of the dissimilar choice attribute will be measured by the average 
dwell time spent in the "s" attribute and the number of fixations in that 
attribute. We expect that, compared to high CRT people, low CRT people will 
fixate less often and less frequently on the dissimilar choice attribute “s” 
while deciding which package to buy. 
H2: As a consequence of failures to integrate the dissimilar attribute with 
the similar ones, the choice accuracy of low CRT people will be lower than 
high CRT people. 
This is due to the fact that low CRT people tend to consider a partial total 
cost of the deal (the sum of the costs of the three similar choice attributes) 
instead of the full total cost (the sum of the four cost components) when 
making a choice (a choice based on a mental accounting). Choice accuracy is 
measured as the choice proportion of the better deal for each presented 




3.1. CRT and eye movements 
As measures of integration of the "s" element, we utilized the average dwell 
time in "s" and the number of fixations in "s". We choose to use the average 
dwell time instead of the total dwell because the total dwell time and the 
number of fixations on "s" are by nature correlated. Figure 5 shows the 
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scatter plot of the average dwell time and of the number of fixations on "s", 
on the original (left) and log scale (right). The vertical and horizontal lines 
indicate the median values of average dwell time and number of fixations. We 
display the data also in the log-scale, because it is easier to discern the 
different data points in proximity of the median point. The data relative to 
the high CRT subjects (upper quartile) are in orange, and the ones relative to 
the low CRT subjects (lower quartile) in green. We perform correlation tests 
(Spearman’s for the values on the original scale [r=0.025, p = 0.579] and 
Pearson’s correlation on the log-values [r=0.009, p = 0.839]) and conclude 
that we cannot reject the hypothesis of zero correlation. As one can 
qualitatively grasp from Figure 5, there seems to be a relationship between 
CRT and both the average dwell time and the number of fixations. In particular, 
the majority of the data lying in the first quadrant (high average dwell time, 
high number of fixations) belong to high CRT individuals. 
 
 
Figure 5. Scatter plot of average dwell time vs number of fixations on "s", on the 
original (left) and log scale (right). The data for HCRT subjects are in orange, for 
LCRT subjects in green. 
 
As a representation of the average dwell time in the group of high CRT and 
low CRT we reported the heat maps of high CRT (Figure 6) and low CRT 
(Figure 7), representing the average dwell time of the two groups in the same 
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trial (7th trial) and in the same condition (condition one; the attribute "s" is 
in the last column). 
As we can see from these figures, the average dwell time spent in "s" in the 
group of high CRT participants is higher compared to the average dwell time 
of the low CRT participants, in the same trial. 
Therefore, we decided to quantitatively investigate the effect of CRT on the 
average dwell time and on the number of fixations in "s". Here, we would like 
to point out that, while Figure 5, Figure 6 and Figure 7 distinguish only 
between high CRT and low CRT subjects, in our quantitative analysis we 
consider CRT as a metric variable, including for each subjects the specific 




Figure 6. Heat map of the participants with high CRT in the 7th trial. 
 
 





3.1.1. CRT and average dwell time 
To study the dependence of the average dwell time on the CRT, we propose a 
linear mixed effect model with a dependent variable of logged average dwell 
time and an independent variable of CRT value. We used the natural 
logarithm transformation of the average dwell times values in order to 
approximate a normal distribution [41]. Moreover, to account for the within-
subject and within-trial correlation structure, we use additive non-nested 
random effects, respectively subject and trial specific. Finally, the between-
subject condition is incorporated in the linear mixed effect model fixed 
effects, because we selected three conditions out of four possible conditions. We 
control for the condition by adding it as predictor on the right-hand side of the 
model equations. In Table 1 (Appendix B) the outputs of three different mixed 
linear regression models are reported. In the first model, we control for the 
between-subjects condition by modelling it through two dummy variables and 
their interaction with CRT, hence having condition specific intercepts and 
slopes; in the second model, we allow only the intercept to be condition specific; 
in the third model, we omit the control on the condition. According to the 
AIC and BIC criteria, the best model is the one in which the between subject 
condition fixed effect is omitted. After we have appropriately modelled the 
variance structure through the random effects, and we ascertained that the 
subject specific coefficient condition can be omitted from the model, we now 
focused on the effect of CRT on the log average dwell time in "s". By looking 
at the third model, it appears clear that there is a significant effect of CRT on 
average dwell time (β̂  = 0.486, t = 3.72, p < 0.01). In particular, for an 
increase in CRT of ∆CRT we expect a relative change in the average dwell 
time of 100(e0.486∆CRT - 1)%. This corresponds to an expected relative 
change in the average dwell time of 3.53%, for each additional right answer 
in the CRT test. 
 




To study the dependence of the number of fixation numbers on the CRT, 
we use a generalized mixed effect model, specifically a Poisson model with a 
logarithmic link function. The count dependent variable is the number of 
fixations, and the independent variable of interest is the CRT value. As done 
previously, we account for the within subject and within trial correlation 
structure through additive non nested random effects, respectively subject 
and trial specific, and we control for the between subject condition. In Table 
2 (Appendix B) the outputs from three different mixed effect Poisson 
regression models are reported. As before, in the first model, we control for 
the between subjects condition by modelling it through two dummy 
variables and their interaction with CRT; in the second model, we allow only 
the intercept to be condition specific; in the third model, we omit the 
control on the condition. The significance of the parameters shows 
support for a significant difference in the intercept for the second condition 
and the first condition. However, on the basis of the model selection criteria, 
and following the principle of parsimony, there is support for choosing the 
third model. The third model shows a significant effect of the CRT on the 
number of fixations (β̂  = 0.614, z = 1.986, p < 0.05). When the CRT increases 
by ∆CRT , the predicted relative increase in the fixation count increases 
by 100(e0.614∆CRT - 1)%. This means that, when the number of corrected 
answers in the CRT increases by one, we expect a relative change in the 
number of fixations of 4.48%. 
In this quantitative analysis we consider CRT as a metric variable, but we 
reported in Figure 8 and Figure 9 the transitions of a high and low CRT 
participant in the 7th trial in the first condition (the attribute "s" is in the last 





Figure 8. Fixations and saccades of a high CRT participant in the 7th trial. 
 
 
Figure 9. Fixations and saccades of a low CRT participant in the 7th trial. 
 




3.2. Choice Accuracy 
3.2.1. Choice Accuracy and CRT 
We study the relationship between choice accuracy and CRT by means of 
generalized mixed effect model, in particular we perform a mixed effect 
logistic regression. The response variable is binary and indicates if the trial for 
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a specific subject was answered correctly. As previously done, we control for 
the within effect of subject and trial through additive random effects, and we 
introduce the between conditions through dummy variables. Moreover, we 
add a dummy variable, which indicates whether the trial was critical. A trial 
was defined as critical if the role of the "s" was crucial for the choice; more 
deeply, if the integration of the value of "s" leads to switch the website 
preference. In Table 3 (Appendix B) the outputs from three different mixed 
effect logistic regression models are reported. The sixth model is the one with 
lower AIC and BIC. The effect of the CRT on the choice accuracy is significant 
(β̂  = 1.486, z = 3.342, p < 0.001). The coefficient relative to the CRT in this 
model indicates the expected log odds of the probability of making the right 
choice, when the CRT goes from 0 to 1. This means that considering people 
with two levels of CRT which differ of ∆CRT, brings to an expected odds 
ratio e1.486∆CRT . Answering correctly to one more question on the CRT gives 
an estimated odd ratio of the probability of making the right choice of 1.111. 
 
3.2.2 Additional Analyses 
 
We decided to compute additional analyses in order to deal with a possible 
interpretation of the concept of “similarity”. The analysis mentioned above 
are based on a semantic similarity. The “s” element is different to the others 
because it was classified as not belonging to the same category of “p”, “q” and 
“r” from a semantic point of view. Anyway, a numerical dissimilarity could 
also emerge from the comparison between these elements and an important 
question to answer could be: “Does numerical format dissimilarity matter?. 
An element could be considered as different to the others because it is in 
percentage and the others are not. We decided to analyze this aspect in order 
to understand if the numeric format dissimilarity, the within subject factor, 
leads to different attentional patterns. In the first condition only the “r” 
element is in percentage; in the second condition (perc2 in the tables) only 
the “s” element is in percentage. In the third condition (perc3 in the tables) 
both, “r” and “s” elements are in percentage. We have also taken into 
consideration that this within subject factor (the element in percentage) 
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might interact with the individual numerical abilities. So we decided to 
analyze the numeracy score measured by the 8-item numeracy scale 
developed by Weller et al. ([42]) and its interaction with the numerical format 
of the elements. We analyzed also the position of the “s”, between subject 
factor, in order to check a possible order effect. In the first condition, the “s” 
element is in the last column; in the second condition (pos2 in the tables) the 
“s” element is in the first column and the condition three (pos3 in the tables), 
the “s” element is in the third column. As we can see from the tables (Table 1, 
2 and 3, Appendix C): 
- the percentage format has a greater effect on the number of fixations 
rather than dwell time; 
- the interaction between the percentage format and  numeracy is more 
significant compared to the interaction between the percentage format 
and the CRT score; 
- the fixation length depends more on numeracy (or rather on the 
interaction between numeracy and percentage format); 
- In terms of accuracy, both CRT and numeracy are good predictors. 
 
3.2.2. Choice Accuracy and Eye Movements 
We once again used a mixed effect logistic regression to analyze the 
relationship between choice accuracy and eye movements. Here, the 
independent variables of interest are the average dwell time and the number 
of fixations in "s". To avoid convergence problems of the numerical solver, we 
re scaled the independent variables to be between 0 and 1. This does not involve 
any loss of information, and simply needs to be accounted for in the 
interpretation of the parameters. We ran a series of logistic regressions, whose 
outputs can see in Table 4 (Appendix B). We now focus on the fourth model 
in Table 4. In the fourth model, we see that the significant independent 
variables are the number of fixations (β̂ F IX = −4.959, z = −2.500, p< 0.05), 
and the interactions of the number of fixations and the average dwell time 
(β̂ IN T = 27.8740, z= 2.500, p < 0.01). The fifth and sixth model only account 
for the effects of number of fixations and the average dwell time, 
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respectively. What is interesting is that while the number of fixations had a 
significant effect in the model with the interaction, it does not in the model 
in which it appears alone. On the other hand, the effect of the average dwell 
time which, conditioned on the presence of the number of fixations in the 
model, was significant only in the interaction, is now significant per se. The 
seventh model uses only the product as independent variable, but does not 
perform better than the model with only the average time as independent 
variable. The best model overall remains the fourth model, in which we 
consider the number of fixations and the interaction between the number of 
fixations and the average dwell time. It is not straightforward to interpret the 
coefficients of this model, since we do have a term, which is not linear in the 
parameters, and hence the effect of one independent variable will depend on 
the level of the other one. As seen before, in the context of logistic regression, 
one can think in terms of odds ratios, i.e. the chances of answering correctly 
before and after the increase in the independent variable. When the number 
of fixations increases by ∆FIX , we expect an odds ratio of e −4.959∆F IX + 
27.874∆F IX×DW ELL , which depends on the value of the average dwell time. 
This means that the strength of the effect of the number of fixations depends 
on how long they are on average. The same goes for the interpretation of the 
effect of the average dwell time. Increasing the average dwell time of 
∆DWELL gives an estimated odds-ratio of e 27.874F IX×∆DW ELL. 
In additional analyses (Table 4, Appendix C) we combined cognitive 
reflection with both eye movements measures, number of fixations and the 




Nowadays, an ever-increasing proportion of consumers makes online 
purchases where they are constantly inundated with information, instant 
communications and unfiltered messages. The selection of pertinent 
information and their analysis require particular abilities during the 
purchasing process. In the online purchase market there are offers that 
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require a consumer to purchase bundled services or products. In that light 
we analyzed if people with a higher cognitive impulsivity are more inclined 
to integrate only attributes belonging to the same category when calculating 
the final price to pay. The results have shown that people with lower cognitive 
reflection less often integrate (segregate) the attribute that does not belong to 
the same category of the others. This means they perform an incomplete 
calculation that leads them to choose the less advantageous option (when 
that attribute matters for the amount of the final price). 
Therefore, from this study, we highlighted that cognitive reflection influences 
the mental accounting process and the consequent estimate and choice of the 
best deal. Certain groups of consumers are more vulnerable than others. The 
European unfair commercial practices directive, the consumer protection law 
and the consumer protection statutes recognize the importance of consumer 
vulnerability, and they have implemented consumer policy measures in order 
to protect and safeguard consumers ([43]). From this perspective, a deeper 
analysis of the individual characteristics is advised in order to have a more 
complete view of the forces that act on the freedom to choose. Cognitive 
reflection, as we have seen from this study, plays an important role during the 
analysis and decision-making process, and it should have a direct relevance 







Table 2. Pilot study results for the vacation task. 
 
 
Table 3. Pilot study results for the washing machine task. 
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The cognitive reflection test (CRT) measures the ability to suppress an 
intuitive answer that easily comes to mind. The relationship between the CRT 
and different cognitive biases has been widely studied. The aim of this paper is 
to ask if cognitive reflection is related to how participants allocate their 
attention in two different visual tasks that involve overriding a prepotent 
response. We found that higher cognitive reflection scores predicted fewer 
errors when eye movements need to move away from a salient target and also 
a larger tendency to switch attentional settings depending on which of two 
stimulus colours provided more information. Our results suggest that 
cognitive reflection is related not only to patterns in our thinking but to how 
we allocate attention to the environment. 






Cognitive reflection is the tendency to reflect on a question instead of 
reporting the first, potentially erroneous, response that comes to mind. It was 
initially measured by  the Cognitive Reflection Test  the popular three item test 
in which people have  to solve three problems that automatically generate 
intuitive responses ([1]). All the questions in the CRT evoke a response that is 
incorrect but immediate, intuitive, prepotent, or automatic. This ability "to 
resist reporting the response that first comes to mind”([1], pp.35) has been 
interpreted in the literature using dual-system theories (e.g. [2]; [3] [4]; [5]; 
[6]). Errors on the CRT are believed to occur because System   2 (slow, 
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effortful and reflective) fails to monitor System 1’s outputs and to override its 
functioning (quick, intuitive and heuristic). As such, performance on the CRT 
is generally taken to indicate the degree to which a given person relies on 
System 1 in their thinking ([7]).  
Cognitive reflection has been shown to predict rational thinking, reasoning 
ability across a wide range of heuristics and biases ([7]; [8]), decision-making 
skills, time and risk preferences ([1]), and thinking dispositions ([9]) which in 
turn are related with economic behaviour and decision. For example, Noori 
([10]) showed that people with lower cognitive reflection are significantly more 
likely to exhibit the conjunction fallacy, illusion of control, overconfidence, base 
rate fallacy, and conservatism. 
The relationship between cognitive reflection scores and a susceptibility to a 
wide range of heuristics and biases is consistent with a common cause of over-
reliance on System 1. While the connection between cognitive reflection and 
heuristic thinking has been quite well established, less is known about whether 
cognitive reflection is related to heuristic control of attention in perceptual tasks. 
The link between perception and cognition has been explored in great quantities 
of literature (e.g. [11], [12], [13], [14]). Although perceptual processing is often 
described as automatic ([15]), it can be highly contingent on cognitive control, as 
enabled by attention, which plays an important role in determining what 
information we gather from the environment ([16]). Two-systems views 
(stimulus-driven and goal-driven) have a long history in research on visual 
attention as well ([17], [18]), and to the extent that cognitive dispositions 
measured by the CRT reflect a general tendency towards heuristic control, they 
may not only affect how we think, but what we attend to when impulses and 
goals conflict. Whether or not cognitive reflection is predictive heuristic control 
of attention is important, as many real-world behaviours depend on the ability 
to exert flexible control over visual processing ([19]). 
In the present paper, we tested the hypothesis that cognitive reflection can 
predict how participants allocate their visual attention in a visual search task 
([20]) and in the anti-saccade task ([21]). We chose these tasks because in both 
there is a prepotent behavioural response: in the visual search task, a matching 
bias leads participants to look at the colour mentioned in the search question 
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([22]; [23]), even though this occasionally leads to more searching than 
necessary. In the anti-saccade task participants must overcome the reflex to look 
at a salient target ([21]); "participants must suppress the reflexive urge to look at 
a visual target that appears suddenly in the peripheral visual field and must 
instead look away from the target in the opposite direction [...] A crucial step 
involved in performing this task is the top-down inhibition of a reflexive, 
automatic saccade" ([[21] ], pp. 218). 
For the first time in the literature, these tasks were analyzed as a function of 
CRT scores. Our goal was to test the hypothesis that people with higher cognitive 
reflection have a better ability to override prepotent control over their attention 
when such control is required (as in the anti-saccade task) or simply beneficial 
(as in the search task) and, consequently, a better ability to switch behaviour 
depending on the best strategy to complete a task efficiently. Below, we describe 
these tasks in more detail. 
 
1.1. Visual Search Task 
Rajsic, Wilson, and Pratt ([20]) used a modified visual search task to examine 
whether visual attention was biased to "confirm" a target’s identity in a task 
where other strategies were available. In this task, participants search for a 
target letter among visually similar letters (e.g., a p among b’s, d’s, and q’s) and 
provide a yes/no answer to a question (e.g., "is the p red") asking whether or not 
the target letter is a particular colour. 
Critically, because the target was always present, attending the letters in the 
"yes" colour or the "no" colour exclusively would provide all the information 
necessary for an answer. The task affords two colour-based search strategies 
(see Figure 1). The first is to simply attend letters with the colour mentioned in 
the question. The second is to search so as to minimize the number of letters 
searched (i.e., look at whatever colour is the most rare, and infer the colour by 
exclusion if the target is not in this set). Even though the colour asked about 
did not predict the colour of the target overall, participants showed a bias to 
attend the colour matching the question instead of adopting the second, 
flexible strategy. Although this inflexibility causes more searching than is 
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strictly necessary, it presumably reflects the influence of a fast and simple 
search heuristic (matching bias [23]). 
By varying how many letters in a given search display possess the colour in the 
search question, and (by exclusion) how many did not, Rajsic, Wilson, and 
Pratt were able to measure which colour – if any – participants were more 
likely to attend. They found that even though the question provided no 
information about the target’s likely colour, attention was biased to that 
colour, even though this led to more letters being attended than was strictly 
necessary on some trials. Rajsic, Wilson, and Pratt interpreted this to mean 
that searchers were biased to seek confirmation of the question, providing a 
negative response when confirmation failed. Subsequent research has shown 
that this bias is caused by a tendency to rely on a visual template to guide 
attention ([23]) instead of guiding attention to the rarest colour (which 
provides the most information per letter). That is, participants tend to rely on 
what seems to be the cognitively simpler strategy, one where the colour that is 
attended is not contingent on the stimuli shown on a given trial. 
Given the relationship between cognitive reflection and reliance on thinking 
heuristics ([1]; [24]; [8]; [10]; [25]), we expected that reliance on this 
attentional heuristic may be stronger in those who score lower on the CRT. 
Specifically, we predicted that differences in reliance on attentional heuristics 
would manifest specifically when the number of letters whose colour matched 
the question were in the majority. In this condition, reliance on a visual 
matching bias would lead attention to stimuli matching the colour in the 
question (e.g., to red letters in Figure 1, given the question "is the b red?"). On 
the other hand, more flexible attentional control would lead attention to 
stimuli whose colour mismatch the question, as these stimuli provide more 
information (only two letters must be identified at most before a response can 
be given; e.g., attending green letters in Figure 1 given the question "is the b 
red?"). With respect to the CRT, we hypothesize that: 
 
• HP1.1: People with lower cognitive reflection (below the median) will 
exhibit the matching bias over all colour set sizes, with their first 
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fixations being most likely to go to a letter whose colour matches the 
rule (the one mentioned in the rule).  
• HP1.2: People with higher cognitive reflection will guide attention to 
the colour that provides the most information (i.e., lets them finish a 
search with fewer letters being identified). This means that when 
there are six letters with the matching colour and two letters with the 
mismatching colour, these participants will be less biased (i.e., more 
likely to attend "green" in Condition 6, Figure 1). 
We analyzed the first fixation because it provides a measure of initial 
attentional allocation without needing to consider how participants integrate 
information during search ([20]). 
 
1.2. Antisaccade 
To assess the relationship between cognitive reflection and suppression of a 
prepotent visual response, we measured gaze behaviour in the anti-saccade 
task ([26]). In this task a participant is asked to make a saccade in the direction 
away from the stimulus (anti- saccade condition) or a saccade in the direction 
of the stimulus (pro-saccade condition). They have to fixate a cross in the 
middle of the screen and, after the instruction ("look away" or "look toward"), 
the stimulus is presented to one side of the target. In these tasks two mental 
processes are required: "the inhibition of triggering a reflexive saccade towards 
the stimulus, and the inversion of the visual vector, i.e., the amplitude of the 
stimulus from one hemifield to the other" ([[27]], pp. 429). Successful anti-
saccade performance involves inhibiting the reflex to look at sudden target 
onsets. If differences in CRT reflect a broad reliance on heuristic processing, 
then lower CRT scores should be associated with more errors on anti-saccade 
trials, where visual heuristics conflict with goals. Such a relationship could 
reflect a common reliance on inhibition, as correct responses in the CRT may 
require one to stop the first intuition and correct responses on anti-saccade 
trials require the ability to inhibit an automatic response to look at the stimulus 
that appears. Specifically, we hypothesized that: 
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• HP2: People with lower cognitive reflection will make more errors 
compared to the people with higher cognitive reflection, in the anti-
saccade trials specifically. This is due to their inability to stop an 
automatic behaviour that drives them to look at a target that appears. 
On the other hand, we expect that there is no difference among CRT scores on 
pro-saccade trials because in that specific trial there is not an automatic 
behaviour (such as to look at the stimulus that appears) to block. 
 
1.3. Change detection task 
As an additional variable of interest, we measured the visual working memory 
capacity of participants using a colour change detection task ([28]). Visual 
working memory (VWM) capacity has been found to be quite variable between 
individuals, and predicts aspects of attentional control ([29]; [30]; [31]). 
Furthermore, span measures of working memory capacity predict anti-saccade 
error rate ([32]) and selecting the more efficient sub-set in a visual search 
([33]). As such, we anticipated that it could mediate any relationship between 
the CRT and participants’ control over their visual behaviour in the search and 
anti-saccade tasks, as CRT scores have been linked to working memory 
capacity more generally ([7]). 
  
 2. Methods 
 
2.1. Participants 
54 university students from University of Trento (34 female, 20 male; mean 
age= 23.6 years, SD=4.5) participated to this study. We collected as many 
participants as our resources allowed to increase statistical power. The 
experiment was made incentive compatible; during the instructions we told 
participants that they will receive 3 euros for participation and between 3 and 





The experiment was run on a Dell computer with a 23 inch screen. Responses 
were collected with a standard USB keyboard. Eyetracking data was collected 
using an Eye Link 1000 Plus (SR Research) Binocular Tower Mount which 
provides a data acquisition at up to 2000 Hz, sampling from the right eye. 
Computer-based tasks were programmed in Matlab using the Psychophysics 
Toolbox ([34]; [35]; [36]). CRTs were collected using paper-and-pencil. 
 
2.3. Stimuli and Procedure 
Each participant, after reading the instructions, completed the tasks on the 
computer with eye tracking. In addition to the visual search task ([20]), the anti-
saccade task ([26]), and the colour change detection task ([28]), they completed 
three other tasks as part of a larger research project. After this experiment 
section they completed the four different CRTs mentioned above, without any 
time limit, using paper-and-pencil. 
 
2.3.1. Visual search task 
This task consisted of 90 trials containing a random mixture of 15 trials in 
each of six conditions, fully crossing two factors (matching set size [2, 4, or 6 
letters] and correct response [yes, no]). Each trial began with a 1 second blank 
screen, after which the search prompt was given. Search prompts contained 
that trial’s target letter and a colour (e.g., "Is the p red?"), presented for 2 
seconds. Target letters were randomly selected from the set [p, q, d, b], with 
the remaining three letters used as distractors, and colours were randomly 
selected from the set [red, green], such that either 2, 4, or 6 letters matched 
the colour in the prompt and the target letter either was (for "yes" trials) or 
was not (for "no" trials) the colour from the prompt. After the prompt, 
participants saw a 500ms screen with just a fixation mark in the center of the 
screen. After this, the search display appeared, with eight letters (seven 
distractors and one target letter, approximately 0.6◦ X 1.1◦) appearing evenly 
distributed on the circumference of a 10.5◦ radius imaginary circle centred on 





Figure 1. An illustration of the search task with sample search prompt and 
displays (not to scale). Note that the target letter (in this case, "p") is always 
present, but can be either colour (red/green) randomly. 
 
This display remained on screen until the participant responded. Immediately 
following responses, the word "correct" or "incorrect" appeared in the center of 
the screen for 1s. 
 
2.3.2. Antisaccade task 
This task consisted of 80 trials; 40 pro-saccade trials and 40 anti-saccade 
trials, randomly intermixed. Each trials started with the instruction "Look at" 
or "Look away" printed in the center of the screen for 2 seconds to indicate 
what the appropriate response would be (Figure 2). This screen was replaced 
by a fixation cross and two small, white rectangles (0.3◦), 9◦ to the left and 
right of fixation. After a randomized delay (evenly sampled from 2s - 2.5s), a 
1.2◦ target rectangle at one of the two locations (randomly selected) flickered 






Figure 2. An illustration of an antisaccade trial. Note that the target flickered on 
onset. 
 
When participants’ gaze moved 3◦ left or right of fixation, this was considered a 
response. After 300ms, the next trial began unless an error was made. Errors 
were followed by 1 second of feedback ("You looked the wrong way!"). On trials 
where participants moved their eyes before the target, trials ended abruptly, 
and error feedback was presented for 2 seconds ("Do not move your eyes before 
the target occurs."). All such false-start trials were recycled so that every 
participant provided 80 trials with valid target responses. 
 
 
2.3.3. Change detection task 
This task consisted of 160 trials, fully crossing two factors (number of colours 
[2, or 6], and change [absent, present]. Each trial began with a one-second 
fixation mark on a blank screen. The memory sample display then appeared for 
100ms, consisting of either 2 or 6 coloured squares, randomly placed in an 
imaginary square grid spanning 9.7◦, centred on fixation (Figure 3). Squares 
were 1.2◦ in height and width, separated by at least 2.4◦ (center to center). This 
display was replaced by a blank screen with a fixation mark for 900 ms. After 
this, the memory test display appeared until a response was entered. On 
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change absent trials, the test display was identical to the sample display. On 
change trials, one square’s colour was replaced with an unused colour. Colours 
were selected from a set of nine highly discriminable colours (red, green, blue, 
magenta, yellow, orange, grey, white, and black). Participants reported changes 
with the "A" key, and no change with the "L" key. A break was provided every 
60 trials. 
Memory capacity was calculated as k using the whole display equation ([37]) 
with hit rate and false alarm rate at set size six only. Data from set size two 
were used simply to verify that participants used the correct response mapping, 
and to reverse responses when false alarm rate exceeded hit rate. 
 
 
Figure 3. An illustration of the memory task, showing a "change" trial. 
 
What we expected is that this working memory measure could predict whether 
or not participants exert more sophisticated control over their visual behaviour 
in the search and anti-saccade tasks. Given the relationship between CRT and 
working memory (r=0.33, [7]) we expect an interaction between these two 
factors in predicting visual attention in the visual search and anti-saccade tasks 
especially given that working memory ability has been shown to predict anti-
saccade performance ([[38]]) and the ability to restrict visual search to a colour 
subset ([[39]]). It is important to note that our measure of working memory 
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did not measure span, but rather capacity (but see [[40]]), and so generalizing 
these results should be approached with caution. Indeed, one might reasonably 
argue that this task better taps a visual short-term memory store than visual 
working memory per se, although researchers currently do not agree on how to 
best use these terms ([41]). 
 
2.3.4. Cognitive Reflection Test 
We used four different versions of the CRT in order to cope with the 
spread of the correct answers of Frederick’s ([1]) and to have a more 
complete measurement of this construct. In addition to the original CRT 
([1]), we used three tests ([8]; [42]; [43]). 
Toplak et al. ([8]) added four items to the original test, to have a seven-item 
test (CRT7); Primi et al. ([42]) added three items to the original test (CRT 
long, CRT-L); Thomson and Oppenheimer ([43]) developed a four-item test 
in order to increase the number of questions in the test and to address a 
numeracy confounding. 
The final CRT score was measured as the number of correct answers divided 
by the total number of questions. 
 
 3. Results 
 
3.1. Task analysis 
Before analyzing how the CRT predicts performance in our three 
cognitive tasks, we analyzed each individually to ensure that the expected 
patterns of results were found. Average performance in each task is shown 






Figure 4. Average performance in the visual search (panel A), anti-saccade 
(panel B), and CRT(panel C) tasks. All error bars depict one standard error of 
the mean. 
 
For the CRT, the average number of correct answers was 52.9% (SD = 
24.4%).  For the visual search task, as in previous studies the average 
correct search time was fastest for “yes” responses, F(1, 53) = 126.70, p < 
.001, η2p = .71. Search was also slower with more question-matching 
coloured letters, F(2, 106) = 68.01, p < .001, η2p = .56, with significant 
linear, F(1, 53) = 95.60, p < .001, η2p = .64, and quadratic, F(1, 53) = 29.34, 
p < .001, η2p = .36, trends. These factors also interacted, F(2, 106) = 4.66, p 
= .011, η2p = .08. The quadratic trend shows that participants did not 
exclusively attend to the “yes” coloured letters, but were nonetheless biased 
to attend them given that searches were faster when targets appeared in the 
small, matching subset than when they appeared in the small, mismatching 
subset, t(53) = 12.57, p < .001. At all set sizes, search time for “yes” 
responses was faster than search time for “no” responses, ts > 4.86, ps < 
.001. These results generally replicate previous findings that participants’ 
attention is biased by the particular colour they are asked about, although 
this is indeed a bias and not rigid strategy. For the anti-saccade task, we 
found that participants made more errors on anti-saccade (M = 9.95%, SD 
= 7.2%) than pro-saccade (M = 4.2%, SD = 3.1%) trials, t(53) = 6.09, p < 
.001, confirming that anti-saccade trials led to impulsive responses. We also 
noticed that participants made a considerable number of saccades before 
the target appeared (which prematurely ended the trial). These false start 
trials were no more frequent in anti-saccade (M = 12.9%, SD = 10.9%) than 





3.2. Hypothesis 1.1 and Hypothesis 1.2: Does CRT predict attentional 
flexibility? 
We used generalized linear mixed models ([44]), which incorporated both 
fixed-effects parameters and random effects (subjects), to evaluate the 
hypotheses mentioned above. They allowed us to take advantage of trial-level 
data across all participants without collapsing all the data into sample 
averages. The best fitting model was defined, as supported by the model-
selection method ([45]) as the one minimizing the Akaike information 
criterion AIC ([46]). 
In order to test these hypotheses we used as a dependent variable a binary 
measure of whether the first fixation of each trial was on a matching colour (1) 
or if it was on a mismatching colour (0). We considered CRT score, matching 
set size, and change detection task scores as independent variables. Matching 
set size was entered as a dummy variable, with set size four as the intercept. 
This meant that the model was set up to predict increases or decreases in the 
probability of fixating a matching colour when the number of matching 





As we can see from the Table 1 in the Appendix A, the interaction between  
CRT and matching set size six ("Condition 6" in the table) is significant in  
both models, the first (with only CRT: (βINT 1 = −0.848, z = −2.613, p = 
0.009)), and the third model (with CRT  and VWM capacity ("mem_cap" in 
the table): (βINT 2 = 0.774, z = 2.307, p = 0.021)) The beta coefficients of 
these interactions were negative, meaning that people with higher cognitive 
reflection looked first at the matching colour less often when matching 
coloured letters provided less information, compared to people with lower 
CRT. This provides evidence that greater cognitive reflection predicts better 
attentional flexibility: those with more cognitive reflection could attend the 
colour that reduced search load from their first eye movement (see Figure 5, 
rightmost panel). The interaction between matching set size two ("Condition 
2" in the table) and the CRT was not significant, in either model (Figure 5, 
leftmost panel). This means that the CRT did not predict more frequent 
fixations on matching coloured letters when these letters were more salient. 
This could be due to the fact that these letters are salient for two reasons: 
they match the colour mentioned in the question being answered, and they 
are more informative. As such, both inflexible search, driven by matching 
bias, and flexible search, driven by information maximization, would drive 
attention to these stimuli, and so it is possible that high and low cognitive 
reflection participants attended these stimuli for different reasons. As we 
can see from the Figure 5, people with lower cognitive reflection look at the 
matching colour with an above-chance (purple line) probability, regardless 
of the number of letters with the matching colour (so regardless of the 
condition). People with higher cognitive reflection, instead, are able to 
switch strategy depending on the number of letters with the matching 
colour. Clearly, when attending the matching colour is useful (condition 2) 
or harmless (condition 4), higher CRT scores increase the probability of 




Figure 5. The probability of fixating a matching-colour letter first depending on the CRT in 
the three conditions. The horizontal purple line in each plot depicts the probability of fixating 
a matching-colour letter by chance alone, given the number of matching-coloured letters 
relative to the total number of letters on screen (eight) in each condition. Some participants 
had the same value; the value is adjusted to make overlapping data points visible. 
 
However, when attending the matching colour is less helpful (condition 6), 
higher CRT scores are associated with a lower probability of fixating a 
matching coloured letter.  
So, higher CRT scores are associated with more strategic control over eye 
movements in all the conditions which results in a matching bias in the second 
condition but not in the sixth where they looked more at the letters with 
mismatching colour). 
We also computed a matching bias index ([22]), in order to measure how 
much a participant was biased to look at the matching colour (controlling for 





When the measured probability of inspecting the template-matching colour is 
greater than or equal to chance (.25, .5, and .75 for the matching subset sizes 2, 
4, and 6, respectively), the extent of the matching bias is given by p(match) 
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minus chance divided by 1 - chance, which expresses the degree to which 
fixations go to matching-colour letters above what would be expected by 
random eye movements. When the measured probability of inspecting the 
template-matching colour is lower than the chance, the matching bias is given 
by p(match) minus chance divided by chance. 
As we can see from the Figure 6, while participants with lower cognitive 
reflection have a fairly consistent bias towards the matching colour, 
participants with higher cognitive reflection are better able to resist the 
matching bias and to use an attentional strategy that promotes switching 















Figure 6. Matching bias index and CRT. 
 
With regard to VWM capacity as a predictor as we can see from the Table 1 
(Appendix A), it did not predict attentional flexibility in either model (the 
second with only the memory measure and the third with the memory 
measure and CRT). However, we note that the simple correlation between 
memory capacity and the matching bias index was positive in the matching set 
size two condition, r (52) = .299, p = .028, consistent with the conclusion that 
visual working memory capacity relates to the general ability to selectively 
attend information using colour. 
These results verify hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2, lending support to the conclusion 
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that cognitive reflection also predicts the ability to more flexibly control 
attention based on the current situation. With respect to the role of VWM 
capacity in this visual search task, we found only weak evidence for a 
relationship between it and this particular form of attentional control. 
 
3.3. Hypothesis 2.1 and Hypothesis 2.2: Does CRT predict anti and pro 
errors in the antisaccade task? 
To measure anti-saccade errors, we coded each trial’s response for each 
participant as a 1 for correct and a 0 for incorrect saccades, excluding trials 
where eyes moved before the target onset. We considered CRT score and VWM 
capacity as independent variables. 
We can see from Table 2 (Appendix A) only CRT scores (in the model with 
CRT as a single predictor) predict how often participants made errors in anti-
saccade trials, (βAE = 0.951, z  =  2.099,  p = 0.036). The negative beta shows 
that participants with lower cognitive reflection were more likely to make anti-
saccade errors confirming hypothesis 2.2 (see Figure 7). 
We computed a similar model on pro-saccade trials ("look towards" trials) to test 
if the CRT predicts the ability to inhibit a response (such as looking at a 
stimulus) or if it instead simply predicts better performance in both kinds of 
trials. As we can see from Table 3 (Appendix A), neither CRT nor visual memory 
capacity predicted performance in the pro-saccade trials of the anti-saccade task. 
As we can see from the Figure 7, the modelled probability of error in the anti-
saccade trials goes from almost 
0.14 for the participants that scored CRT=0 to 0.07 for the participants with 
CRT=1. So the probability to make an error in the anti-saccade trials is doubled 
if we compare participants with CRT=0 to participants with CRT=1.  On the 
other hand, there is an almost equal, and very low, probability to make an error 





Figure 7. The probability of error depending on CRT and on the trial type. Several 
participants had the same value; the value is adjusted to make overlapping data 
points visible. 
 
Indeed, if we compare the pro and anti-saccade trials (Figure 8) we can see that 
in the pro-saccade trials there is no difference between low CRT and high CRT 
participants; instead, there is a significant difference between these two groups 






Figure 8. Probability of making an error in pro-saccade and anti-saccade trials depending on 
CRT. 
 
As noted in section 4.1, we found a high false-start rate in the group with low 
cognitive reflection. We considered these saccadic false starts as a form of 
impulsivity so we decided to analyze if CRT predicts false starts in the anti-
saccade task. To the extent that participants make impulsive eye movements 
before the target onsets, these too should be more frequent in participants with 
lower CRT scores. In order to test this hypothesis we used as dependent variable 
whether the participant made a false start (1) or not (0) on each trial. We 
considered CRT score and k score as predictor variables. 
As can be seen in Table 4. (Appendix A), only CRT predicted false starts in the  
model with CRT as a single predictor,(βF S = 1.247, z = 2.724, p = 0.006). The 
negative beta value shows that participants with lower cognitive reflection were 
more likely to make false starts. However, visual working memory capacity did 




Figure 9. Probability of making a false start depending on the CRT. 
 
As we can see from the Figure 9, the probability of making a false start in the 
anti-saccade task for participants with CRT=0 is equal to 0.2 and for 
participants with CRT=1 is around 0.07. Higher CRT scores, then, are associated 
with a higher rate of impulsive saccades in the anti-saccade task. 
 
 4. Discussion 
 
Cognitive reflection is believed to result from individual differences in the 
control of System 2 processes over System 1 processes. The CRT was designed 
to exploit heuristics that lead to an erroneous but intuitive response, and 
scores on this task predict a wide range of heuristics and biases indicative of 
System 1 processes ([47]). In the present study, we sought to test whether 
cognitive reflection relates not only to reliance on heuristics in thinking, but 
also to reliance on heuristics in controlling attention in visual tasks. To do this, 
we measured CRT scores for participants who also completed an anti-saccade 
task (measuring the ability to resist attending to a salient input) and a visual 
search task (measuring the ability to flexibly change attentional settings on 
each trial). Both tasks pit heuristic actions (look at the target; attend the colour 
 
 137 
mentioned in the question) against more controlled responses (look away from 
the target; look at the colour that provides the most information). 
We found that the CRT indeed predicted flexible attentional control in 
these two tasks. From these results, we suggest that cognitive reflection 
scores may not only indicate thinking dispositions, but potentially broader 
tendencies towards heightened behavioural control. Tentatively, we suggest 
that what links cognitive reflection and attentional control is the general 
tendency to suppress a planned or reflexive control signal and switch to 
another. Both tasks have an "intuitive" tendency that can be overcome with 
additional cognitive control that presumably relies on executive functions 
([38]; [39]), which have been found to be stronger in those with higher CRT 
scores ([48]). In other words, CRT scores and attentional performance (as 
measured in the visual search and anti-saccade tasks) may both reflect 
differences in cognitive control. Although cognitive reflection may involve 
more than the suppression of the first answer ([49]), cognitive inhibition or 
impulsivity provides an intuitive link between high CRT scores and the 
improved attentional flexibility found in our experiment. Indeed, this 
executive function can be seen as a point of contact between cognitive 
reflection and attention differences; it could cause differences in attention 
and cognitive reflection. However, further research is needed to isolate the 
specific roles and causal relationships between these variables; while our 
results provide initial evidence that attentional control and cognitive 
reflection may be linked, further studies are needed in order to more clearly 
specify the precise overlap between the CRT and attentional control. It is 
worth being cautious in extending concepts like "inhibition" across tasks and 
domains (see [50] ; [51]). Rather, there may instead be specific executive 
functions that could overlap between attentional control and thinking that 
account for these relationships. Alternatively, these results could reflect a 
broader willingness or ability to adopt more cognitively demanding, but 
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This thesis explored the concept of Cognitive Reflection and its influence on 
judgment and decision-making related to different kinds of tasks. The main 
idea of this thesis is related to the predictive power of cognitive reflection on 
heuristics and biases. Given its relationship with the monitoring of System 2 on 
System 1 we studied how cognitive reflection affects the consumer decision-
making process and how people allocate their attention in visual search tasks. 
Four are the main empirical findings of this thesis and they are chapter 
specific:  
- we demonstrated that numeracy is not the only relevant cognitive ability that 
plays a role in problem solving scenarios with high numerical components 
and we have proposed the concept of “overlapping vulnerabilities” in order to 
depict the nature of the consumer where different forces (cognitive abilities) 
contribute during the decision-making process for the final choice (Study 1); 
- we showed that cognitive reflection affects how we analyze information in 
consumer problem solving scenarios; people with lower cognitive reflection 
are more affected by heuristics and biases (a more superficial analysis) also 
in tasks with high numerical components (Study 1); 
- we showed that people categorize attributes of the same product (or service) 
and use integration/ segregation processes to analyze information and 
consequently make decisions (Study 2); 
- we demonstrated that people with lower cognitive reflection are more 
affected by this mental accounting process and therefore they do not 
integrate all the information which is useful to make an accurate decision 
(Study 2); 
- finally we demonstrated that cognitive reflection affects also how we allocate 
our attention in visual search, supporting the idea that this cognitive ability 
is a trait related not only to cognition but also to the initial step of perceptual 
visual search (Study 3). 
